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Does Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements 
Promote “Autonomy”? 
HIRO N. ARAGAKI* 
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has helped transform arbitration law into 
a radical private-ordering regime in which freedom of contract has come to eclipse 
public regulation. Arbitration jurisprudence justifies this transformation in part on 
a profound and longstanding commitment to the ideal of individual autonomy, 
understood as the freedom—lacking in litigation—to select a disputing process best 
suited to one’s needs.  
In this Article, I question the cogency of this justification. I argue, first, that 
autonomy has had different and sometimes conflicting meanings even within 
arbitration jurisprudence. Second, depending on the meaning one ascribes to 
autonomy, it is at best uncertain whether a commitment to it requires enforcing 
arbitration agreements with minimal regulation by the state. Ironically, the 
libertarian interpretation of autonomy that lies at the heart of the Court’s recent 
arbitration decisions turns out to be the least adept at explaining why arbitration 
agreements should be “‘rigorously enforce[d]’ . . . according to their terms.” To the 
extent we wish to continue viewing enforcement as important for the value of 
autonomy in arbitration, therefore, it appears we must rethink what autonomy means 
in this context and whether in certain circumstances autonomy may be best promoted 
by refusing to enforce arbitration agreements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the early twenty-first century, it is no exaggeration to declare that freedom of 
contract is now “at the very core of how the law regulates arbitration.”1 By freedom 
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of contract, I mean the enforcement of arbitration agreements with minimal 
regulation by the state—what the U.S. Supreme Court has described as “‘rigorously 
enforc[ing]’ arbitration agreements according to their terms.”2 
The triumph of freedom of contract in the arbitration area is evident in a number 
of different ways. Although arbitration was once largely limited to contractual 
claims,3 in the modern era agreements to arbitrate are enforceable even as to claims 
under Title VII and other federal statutes designed to further important public 
interests.4 It matters little whether the terms of the agreement make it too costly or 
burdensome as a practical matter to bring such causes of action in the arbitral forum. 
For as the Court recently explained, the law’s “command to enforce arbitration 
agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of . . . claims.”5  
Likewise, under the doctrine of Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preemption, 
private agreements to arbitrate are now effectively immunized from any state 
legislation or public policy.6 Thus, arbitrators may award punitive damages even if 
state law reserves such quasi-public remedies exclusively to judicial processes.7 State 
legislatures are powerless to promote informed assent to so-called mandatory 
arbitration clauses—for example, by requiring such clauses to be printed in 
underlined capital letters on the face of an adhesion contract.8 The net effect is that 
arbitration agreements are not just enforced but rigorously enforced to a degree 
                                                                                                                 
 
Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189, 1193 (2003) [hereinafter 
Carbonneau, Contract Freedom] (criticizing this view); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, At 
the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213, 258 (2005) 
[hereinafter Carbonneau, Crossroads] (describing freedom of contract as an “absolute value” 
in arbitration); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 
YALE L.J. 3052, 3068 (2015) (describing the Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence as a 
“pure freedom of contract” paradigm (emphasis in original)); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in 
Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 486 (1997) (“[T]he arbitration process is in fact all 
about . . . private ordering and self-determination.”).  
 2. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (quoting Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
 3. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 
Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 25 (1924) (statement of 
Alexander Rose, Arbitration Society of America).  
 4. See Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1256–57 
(2011). 
 5. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5. 
 6. In effect, such agreements are enforced “notwithstanding any state substantive or 
procedural policies to the contrary.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 7. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57, 61 n.7 (1995); cf. 
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 21(a) & cmt. 1 (2000), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org
/shared/docs/arbitration/arbitration_final_00.pdf [https://perma.cc/GN2W-VBV7] (permitting 
punitive damages in arbitration); NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AM. 
ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES princ. 14 
& cmt. (1998), available at https://adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014 [https://perma.cc
/KK8B-PTH9] (permitting punitive damages in consumer arbitration). 
 8. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
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unknown in other contracting contexts. This has led many commentators to claim 
that arbitration agreements are a type of “super contract.”9 
What explains the law’s embrace of a radical private-ordering regime in the 
arbitration area? To realists, it is a function of the Court’s conservative, pro-business 
leanings.10 Positivists, on the other hand, will explain it as flowing inexorably from 
the plain language of the FAA—language that seems practically to dictate freedom 
of contract by declaring that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable” subject only to common-law contract defenses.11 Theorists will give 
still a third answer: enforcing arbitration agreements strictly according to their terms 
is a natural implication of the strong commitment in both arbitration law and practice 
to the ideal of personal autonomy. It is this last explanation that I propose to 
interrogate in this Article.  
Autonomy has for some time occupied a central place in arbitration jurisprudence 
and in the jurisprudence of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) more generally.12 
Unlike the one-size-fits-all approach of litigation, arbitration’s hallmark has been the 
wide scope of choice that it provides for parties to design a disputing procedure best 
suited to their needs and circumstances.13 From the Court of Arbitration for Sport14 
to the Writers Guild arbitration procedure,15 arbitration has given parties the freedom 
to develop a stunning diversity of procedures designed to meet the unique challenges 
of a variety of different disputing contexts. This has led courts and commentators to 
claim that party autonomy is not just one among many distinctive values in 
arbitration; it is “the highest priority in the pantheon of arbitration values.”16 I refer 
to this as the “autonomy thesis.” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See infra notes 120–23 and accompanying text. 
 10. See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 74, 96 (2011); Andrew Cohen, No Class: The Supreme Court’s Arbitration 
Ruling, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive
/2011/04/no-class-the-supreme-courts-arbitration-ruling/237967/ [https://perma.cc/GX8K-APTS].  
 11. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added) (making arbitration clauses enforceable except 
on “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” (emphasis 
added)); see Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1246–47 (noting that the savings clause has been 
construed as including only common-law contract defenses).  
 12. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of 
Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 65 (1999) (“Party autonomy is a significant feature of all 
ADR, and constitutes an especially critical underpinning to arbitration theory and practice.”). 
 13. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 
50–51. 
 14. See generally Richard H. McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An 
Independent Arena for the World’s Sports Disputes, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 379 (2001). 
 15. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc., 277 Cal. Rptr. 450 (Ct. App. 
1991); WRITERS GUILD OF AM., W., THE LEGAL ARBITRATION PROCESS, available at 
http://www.wga.org/uploadedfiles/if_you_are_a_member/arbitration_pamphlet.pdf [https://perma.cc
/ZQU7-Q4NC]. 
 16. Edward Brunet, The Core Values of Arbitration, in EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. 
SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3, 5 (2006); see also id. at 4 (describing party autonomy as “the 
fundamental value of arbitration”). 
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At a superficial level the autonomy thesis seems to help explain why the Court 
views the rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements as the “preeminent” or 
“primary” purpose of federal arbitration law.17 For by faithfully enforcing arbitration 
agreements, the state appears to do little more than create space for the parties freely 
to pursue their own ideas of the “good” of dispute resolution.18 By contrast, 
regulating such agreements appears to restrict autonomy because it risks imposing 
external values about adjudication on the parties—values that they did not 
necessarily freely choose.19  
In this Article, I question whether the autonomy thesis points unproblematically 
in the direction of enforcing arbitration agreements with minimal regulation by the 
state. I argue that autonomy can mean many different things and that, depending on 
the conception of autonomy to which one subscribes, autonomy might require not 
freedom of contract but rather freedom from contract. Although philosophers have 
for a long time sought to understand the multiple and often conflicting ways of 
understanding autonomy, courts and commentators writing in the arbitration area 
have paid comparatively little attention to these nuances. As a result, they have been 
led to overestimate the persuasiveness of the autonomy thesis in justifying the 
rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements.  
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I seek to better understand the nature 
of the autonomy thesis—in particular, whether it is a claim primarily about negative 
or positive liberty. Some commentators cleave to the staunchly libertarian view that 
autonomy is little more than the absence of external constraints on choice, while 
others betray a much more robust conception of autonomy as a type of 
self-governance. But the diversity of views among commentators has not (for the 
most part) been reflected in the Court’s modern arbitration jurisprudence. At the heart 
of that jurisprudence, I argue, is a conception of autonomy qua negative liberty.  
In Part II, I evaluate the extent to which a commitment to the autonomy thesis (in 
either its negative or positive variants) requires rigorously enforcing arbitration 
agreements. The argument in favor of rigorous enforcement entails two things: (i) an 
affirmative argument for enforcement and (ii) an argument against the regulation of 
that enforcement by the state. I conclude that interpreting autonomy in negative 
liberty terms presents a weak justification for either (i) or (ii). Although interpreting 
autonomy in positive terms presents a somewhat stronger affirmative argument for 
why arbitration agreements should be enforced, it does not necessarily imply 
minimal regulation by the state. Positive liberty is moreover in tension with the 
strong negative liberty orientation of arbitration law. Forging a more persuasive and 
balanced link between autonomy and enforcement along positive liberty lines would 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010); Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); accord Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995) (“[T]he basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to 
overcome courts’ refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate.”). 
 18. As Thomas Stipanowich put it, “[a]rbitration law promotes the autonomy of parties 
by enforcing their agreements to arbitrate.” Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration 
Penumbra: Arbitration Law and the Rapidly Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8 
NEV. L.J. 427, 430 (2007). 
 19. See George A. Bermann, Ascertaining the Parties’ Intentions in Arbitral Design, 113 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1013, 1028 (2008).  
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therefore require relinquishing important features of the Court’s modern arbitration 
jurisprudence.  
I. MAKING SENSE OF THE AUTONOMY THESIS 
Many important values animate the law and practice of arbitration. Autonomy—broadly 
construed as the freedom to design a process tailored to the parties’ needs—is 
certainly one such value. So is procedural simplicity or efficiency,20 which is 
believed to reduce the time and cost of adjudication and to produce other systemic 
benefits such as clearing congested court dockets.21 Still another is the preservation 
of business relationships and discouraging unnecessary adversarialism.22 And as I 
have elsewhere argued, access to justice and better procedure were also expressed 
reasons to prefer arbitration over litigation around the time the FAA was enacted.23  
What I shall call the “autonomy thesis” is the now well-entrenched claim that 
autonomy is (or should be) the primary value that animates arbitration law and 
policy.24 Thus, Thomas Stipanowich argues that “the central and primary value of 
arbitration is not speed, or economy, or privacy, or neutral expertise, but rather the 
ability of users to make key process choices to suit their particular needs.”25 Stephen 
Ware likewise claims that because “‘autonomy . . . [i]s the value that transcends these 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) 
(observing that “the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost 
and increasing the speed of dispute resolution”); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684–86 (observing 
that, by increasing costs and decreasing efficiency and speed, class arbitration “changes the 
nature of arbitration”); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) 
(describing “arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway”). 
 21. Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee & David Hubbert, 
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1363 (“Arbitration is a process disputants have used for years in an 
effort to circumvent the court system’s costly delays and congested dockets.” (footnote 
omitted)); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 642 (1996) (linking the Court’s 
aggressively pro-arbitration jurisprudence beginning in the 1980s with a “growing concern 
that dockets were overloaded”). 
 22. See, e.g., Advantages Ascribed to Arbitration, 9 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 73, 74 
(1925) (“Arbitration [c]onserves [f]riendly [r]elations”); Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a 
Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982); Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why 
Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses? 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 
451–52 (2010). 
 23. See Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1939 (2014). 
 24. See, e.g., UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT prefatory note (2000) (“[A]utonomy of the 
parties . . . should be given primary consideration . . . .”); Gary Born & Claudio Salas, The 
United States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 
21, 39 (“[A]rbitration is aimed first and foremost at ensuring the parties’ procedural 
autonomy.”); Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach 
to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1069 (1987) (theorizing that “the 
legitimacy of arbitral proceedings flows directly from a vision of private autonomy as the 
conceptual basis of contract law”). 
 25. Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 51. 
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other values,’” it is “arbitration’s essential virtue.”26 So, too, Edward Brunet declares 
that “party autonomy [is] the highest priority in the pantheon of arbitration values.”27 
Consistent with these claims, Alan Rau contends that “arbitration should be 
understood through the lenses of contract rather than of adjudication” and that with 
respect to arbitration law, “the only serious inquiry ought to be one into the 
understanding and underlying assumptions of the contracting parties.”28 
But despite what may be a near “universal[]”29 acceptance of the significance of 
autonomy to arbitration law and policy, it is an underappreciated fact that there is 
little agreement about what exactly autonomy in this context means. Many 
contemporary debates in arbitration can be understood as debates not over the 
relative importance of autonomy vis-à-vis other values but over the meaning of 
autonomy itself. Until we are clear about that meaning, therefore, it will be 
impossible to assess the claim that the autonomy thesis favors the rigorous 
enforcement of arbitration agreements. In this Part, I attempt to bring this clarity.  
A. Negative and Positive Liberty 
A distinction is often drawn in liberal political theory between “negative” and 
“positive” liberty.30 Although the distinction has been subject to extensive 
criticism,31 for my purposes it provides a useful analytic framework through which 
to understand the autonomy thesis.  
From a negative liberty standpoint, freedom is little more than the absence of 
external restraint or coercion by the state or by private actors.32 As Isaiah Berlin put 
it, “I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men 
interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this [negative] sense is simply the area 
within which a man can act unobstructed by others.”33 Negative liberty has often 
been described as an “opportunity concept” because it conceives of freedom merely 
in terms of how many doors are open rather than slammed shut.34 The inherent appeal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. Stephen J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & 
MEDIATION 56, 92 (2014) (quoting Stephen Ware, Comments of Professor Stephen Ware, in 
BRUNET ET AL., supra note 16, at 327, 339). 
 27. Brunet, supra note 16, at 5. 
 28. Rau, supra note 1, at 487. 
 29. S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? 
Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 226 
(2012) (observing that “party autonomy . . . is universally agreed to be a fundamental principle 
of arbitration”). 
 30. The most well-known statement of this distinction is Isaiah Berlin’s. See ISAIAH 
BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). 
 31. See generally KATRIN FLIKSCHUH, FREEDOM: CONTEMPORARY LIBERAL 
PERSPECTIVES (2007). 
 32. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 16–17 (1960) (defining liberty 
as the absence of both “restraint,” in the sense of being prevented from taking certain actions, 
and “constraint,” in the sense of being forced to take certain actions).  
 33. BERLIN, supra note 30, at 122. 
 34. 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?, in PHILOSOPHY & THE 
HUMAN SCIENCES 211, 213–14 (1985). Berlin, in particular, conceived of negative liberty 
using the metaphor of open doors. BERLIN, supra note 30, at xxxix (describing negative liberty 
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of this conception is that it is value neutral: it imports no substantive judgments about 
how easy or difficult it is to walk through any given door—indeed, about which open 
doors are worth walking through to begin with—and thus about what real freedom 
looks like.35 To borrow Lea Brilmayer’s example, from a negative liberty standpoint 
the “life choices of the beer-swilling, pornography-reading jet-ski cowboy” are no 
less free—or deserving of freedom—than those of “the bookish intellectual.”36 
Freedom consists rather in the individual’s essential separateness from others and 
from the state.37  
Classical utilitarianism, by contrast, paid little respect to this separateness. It had 
few qualms about sacrificing the freedom of some to improve the welfare of the many 
through, for instance, redistributive measures.38 But from a liberal perspective that 
places a premium on the sanctity of the individual, this type of intervention “fails to 
take seriously the distinction between persons.”39 True freedom requires instead that 
individuals be treated as ends in themselves, not as mere means toward the 
achievement of other public or private objectives.40 This, in turn, entails that they 
possess rights against intrusions on their freedom both by others and by the state.41 
It explains why rights-based theories tend to find their origin in theories of negative 
liberty. 
On the negative liberty view, therefore, freedom is inversely related to 
government regulation. States do not respect individual freedom through social 
assistance, measures designed to promote human flourishing, or other forms of what 
Sir William Vernon-Harcourt described as “grandmotherly government.”42 They do 
so instead by staying out of everyone’s business. It is for this reason that negative 
liberty theories typically betray a deep skepticism of centralized decision making, 
paternalism, and state intervention in free markets.43 Restrictions on freedom can 
                                                                                                                 
 
as dependent, inter alia, on “how many doors are open” and “how open they are”).  
 35. HAYEK, supra note 32, at 18 (“[T]o be free may mean freedom to starve, to make 
costly mistakes, or to run mortal risks.”).  
 36. Lea Brilmayer, Lonely Libertarian: One Man’s View of Antidiscrimination Law, 31 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 123 (1994).  
 37. See H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 829–34 (1979) 
(describing rights-based liberal and libertarian theories as emphasizing the moral 
“separateness” of individuals). 
 38. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, The Philosophy of Economic Science, in 1 W. STARK, 
JEREMY BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS 81, 115–16 (1952). 
 39. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 187 (1971).  
 40. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 30, 48–50 (1974). 
 41. This is the move Robert Nozick makes in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Nozick argues 
that rights as “[s]ide constraints upon action reflect the underlying Kantian principle that 
individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving 
of other ends without their consent. Individuals are inviolable.” NOZICK, supra note 40, at 31.  
 42. See T.H. Green, Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, in THE LIBERTY 
READER 21, 25 (David Miller ed., 2006).  
 43. For example, Mill famously took the view that the state may not compel 
individuals to 
do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him 
happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. 
These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or 
1150 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 91:1143 
 
only be justified on narrow and supposedly value-neutral terms such as preventing 
harm to, or securing a like freedom for, others.44 
If negative liberty is more of an “opportunity concept,” positive liberty is 
better understood as an “exercise concept”: it asks not just how many doors are 
open, but whether their being open contributes in any meaningful sense to one’s 
freedom—especially if one lacks the resources, wherewithal, or maturity to walk 
through any of them.45 A bird in the wild whose wings have been clipped has the 
opportunity to fly in the sense that nobody is preventing it from doing so, such as by 
confining it to a cage; from a negative liberty standpoint it is therefore perfectly free. 
But as Bishop Bramhall once put it, this is at best a “brutish liberty”46 because the 
physical handicap renders the bird unable to exercise this freedom in any real or 
meaningful way. Freedom in the positive sense is therefore often described as a 
freedom “to”—what John Dewey referred to as an “effective power to do specific 
things.”47 To positive liberty theorists, the bare freedom “from” constraint is an 
impoverished conception of freedom. Although freedom from external constraint 
may be a necessary ingredient of freedom insofar as a caged bird with its wings intact 
is also unable to fly, it does not fully capture what it means to be free.  
Positive freedom can also be conceived in much thicker terms, as denoting a kind 
of “self-realization,”48 “self-mastery,”49 or “self-determination.”50 This is the sense 
in which the term “autonomy” has traditionally been used.51 The difference between 
                                                                                                                 
 
persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him 
with any evil in case he do otherwise. 
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
1998). 
 44. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 387–88 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & 
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (asserting that individual freedom may be legally 
restricted so that the free use of one’s choice can co-exist with everyone else’s freedom under 
a universal law); MILL, supra note 43, at 14 (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others.”).  
 45. See TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 213–14. 
 46. John Bramhall, A Defence of True Liberty, in HOBBES & BRAMHALL ON LIBERTY & 
NECESSITY 43, 44 (Vere Chappell ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999); see also Morris R. 
Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 560 (1933) (observing that the (negative) 
freedom to make a million dollars is not meaningful if one finds oneself out of work).  
 47. John Dewey, Liberty and Social Control, in 11 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN 
DEWEY 360, 360 (John J. McDermott and Jo Ann Boydston eds., Southern Illinois Univ. Press 
2008); accord RAWLS, supra note 39, at 204 (distinguishing between “liberty” in the negative 
sense and the “worth of liberty” in the sense of having the means to achieve one’s aims). 
 48. TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 215–17. 
 49. John Christman, Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom, 101 ETHICS 343, 344 
(1991) (describing positive liberty not just in terms of the absence of constraint but also in 
terms of a “capacity for self-mastery and self-government”).  
 50. See JOHN GRAY, On Negative and Positive Liberty, in LIBERALISMS: ESSAYS IN 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 45, 57 (1989). 
 51. “Autonomy” literally means self-legislation, a characteristic originally exemplified 
by Greek city-states that created their own laws rather than have them handed down by foreign 
powers or home-grown tyrants. It was not until the Enlightenment that autonomy came to be 
seen as a property of the individual—what Immanuel Kant and others described as a “property 
2016] AUTONOMY AND RIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT 1151 
 
a thin conception of positive liberty and a thicker conception qua autonomy is that 
the focus of the former is on the ability to do things, whereas the focus of the latter 
is on the capacity to be a certain type of rational, independent-thinking person—one 
who determines the course of her own life rather than have it be determined for her 
by tradition, peer pressure, or the force of habit.52 This capacity has sometimes been 
described as the ability to make choices about one’s choices.53 That is, a person is 
autonomous in the thick sense not just because she is free to exercise certain 
first-order choices such as whether to smoke a cigarette on any given day; rather, she 
is free because she is able to (and does) make second-order choices about her 
first-order choices, such as by choosing to quit smoking altogether. This is the sense 
in which Gerald Dworkin describes autonomy as a 
second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their 
first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to 
accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and 
values. By exercising such a capacity, persons define their nature, give 
meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind 
of person they are.54  
Thicker conceptions of positive liberty qua autonomy highlight the extent to which 
the mere absence of external constraints, whether on opportunity or exercise, cannot 
be the whole picture. Internal constraints such as fear, false consciousness, 
inadequate information or understanding, lack of motivation, dependency, or poor 
judgment become salient in a way they are not for negative liberty (or even thin 
positive liberty) theories.55  
                                                                                                                 
 
which will has of being a law to itself.” IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC 
OF MORALS 114 (H. J. Paton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1785); accord JEAN JACQUES 
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 16 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950) (describing 
autonomy as “obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves”).  
 52. STANLEY I. BENN, A THEORY OF FREEDOM 176–77 (1988) (“The heteronomous 
person, however, receives his nomos ready-made, as a well-trained, well-drilled solider may 
live punctiliously according to the Manual of Military Law and battalion orders.” (italics in 
original)); Christman, supra note 49, at 344–45. 
 53. See GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 12–20 (1988); 
Christman, supra note 49, at 346. But see Onora O’Neill, Autonomy, Coherence and 
Independence, in LIBERALISM, CITIZENSHIP AND AUTONOMY 203, 207–08 (David Milligan & 
William Watts Miller eds., 1992) (arguing that the idea of autonomy cannot be fully captured 
in terms of the ability to form preferences about one’s preferences). See generally Harry G. 
Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL 5 (1971) 
(distinguishing between the ability to make choices and the ability to make choices about one’s 
choices).  
 54. DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 20. John Christman likewise describes autonomy as 
something “more than having a certain attitude toward one’s desires . . . . [i]t means  . . . that 
one’s values were formed in a manner or by a process that one had (or could have had) 
something to say about.” Christman, supra note 49, at 346. 
 55. See BENN, supra note 52, at 154; TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 215–16 (“You are not 
free if you are motivated, through fear, inauthentically internalized standards, or false 
consciousness, to thwart your self-realization.”); Christman, supra note 49, at 344–45; Joel 
Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 105, 110–12 (1971). 
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There are at least two consequences of a positive conception of freedom. First, 
whereas negative liberty theories seek to minimize the role of the state,56 positive 
liberty theories are not only hospitable to but also sometimes require active state 
assistance in the form of education, subsidies, or other social services designed to 
enable the full or meaningful realization of freedom.57 Second, unlike negative 
liberty theories, positive liberty theories cannot claim to be value neutral. To see how 
this is the case, consider two hypothetical settings58: The first is a city in which 
religious freedom is tolerated but in which every intersection has a traffic light. The 
second is a city in which there are no traffic lights but a local ordinance prohibits 
religious prayer in public spaces. In which city is there less (positive) freedom? Most 
people would likely answer the second, but the real question is why. It cannot be 
because the second city restricts more bare opportunities for free choice, for traffic 
lights apply to everyone (even atheists) and they restrict us in more places and at 
more times of the day than the religious ordinance (after all, few people have the 
need or desire to pray in public multiple times a day). Instead, it is because religion 
has great meaning and worth in our lives, such that the slightest reduction in the 
opportunity to pray is taken as a serious assault on our freedom.59 The freedom to 
drive unimpeded through busy city streets, by contrast, has comparatively little value 
especially when considered against the benefits of coordinating traffic flow—so 
little, in fact, that we likely do not even register the many periods that we are stuck 
at a red light as an unfreedom.60 This leads Charles Taylor to conclude that 
“[positive] freedom requires a background conception of what is significant, 
according to which some restrictions are seen to be without relevance for freedom 
altogether, and others are judged as being of greater and lesser importance.”61  
Making these distinctions, however, invariably requires importing normative 
judgments that can often betray a greater commitment to substantive values than to 
bare freedom of choice. And if so, state intervention designed to deter or punish bad 
choices and promote good ones may become unobjectionable the closer one hews to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 40 (advocating a “night-watchman state”). 
 57. Cass Sunstein takes such a view when he argues that real freedom of choice might 
require educating parties before they enter into certain contracts. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Disrupting Voluntary Transactions, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE 279, 282 (John W. Chapman & 
J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989).  
 58. I have adapted this hypothetical slightly from Charles Taylor. See TAYLOR, supra note 
34, at 218–19.  
 59. Richard Arneson makes a similar point with the colorful example of a recently 
released prisoner who is unable to move his thumbs because they are cast in splints. The extent 
to which we believe the parolee to be positively free depends not on the sheer number of thumb 
movements that he is now precluded from pursuing, but rather in the worth or value of the 
movements that are now foreclosed. If he were a member of a religious cult that placed 
enormous significance on the ability to manipulate one’s thumbs in different positions for 
ritual purposes, for example, it would dramatically change our assessment of his positive 
liberty even though the same number of acts were foreclosed. Richard J. Arneson, “Freedom 
and Desire,” 15 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 425, 426–27 (1985).  
 60. As Taylor explains, “It is not just a matter of our having made a trade-off, and 
considered that a small loss of liberty was worth fewer traffic accidents . . . we are reluctant to 
speak here of a loss of liberty at all . . . .” TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 218 (emphasis added).  
 61. Id. at 219. 
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a positive liberty view.62 A good example here is T.H. Green, who once argued that 
until society reaches a certain stage of enlightenment, intrusive government 
regulation in the form of health, education, and labor laws is justified in order to help 
individuals realize their “real freedom.”63  
The problem is that if restricting choice can be justified as compatible with 
positive liberty, the very distinction between freedom and coercion begins to 
collapse.64 As Berlin well recognized, this is a slippery slope toward something far 
worse than paternalism: 
Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of 
men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on 
behalf, of their “real” selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is 
the true goal of man (happiness, performance of duty, wisdom, a just 
society, self-fulfilment) must be identical with his freedom . . . . 65 
The further we go down the road toward thick and thicker versions of positive liberty, 
therefore, the more we seem to import substantive values that stray from the ideal of 
private ordering. This is perhaps one reason why the dominant conception of 
autonomy in both liberal theory and contract theory alike is that of negative liberty.66  
B. Negative and Positive Interpretations of the Autonomy Thesis 
1. Autonomy as Negative Liberty 
More often than not, “autonomy” in the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence has 
come to signify the wide latitude—virtually unknown in litigation—that parties 
enjoy to make any number of process choices. For example, parties may choose what 
issues to arbitrate (if any), how the arbitration will be conducted (including 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. See, e.g., Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall,” 
79 B.U. L. REV. 263, 288 (1999) (“Positive freedom thus might support a broad range of 
regulatory legislation.”).  
 63. Green, supra note 42, at 26. 
 64. Cf. Pettit, supra note 62, at 289 (noting that such a position allows “those arguing for 
labor legislation . . . or for the unconscionability of a contract [to] claim that they are arguing 
for freedom”). 
 65. BERLIN, supra note 30, at 133; see also ISAIAH BERLIN, “From Hope and Fear Set 
Free,” in CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES 173 (Henry Hardy ed., 1978). 
 66. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 107 (2004); see also id. at 47 (“In 
practice . . . nearly all rights theories regard contractual rights as classically individualist or 
‘negative-liberty’ rights.”). It should come as no surprise that the chief architects of classical 
contract law, such as Christopher Columbus Langdell and Oliver Wendell Holmes were arch 
formalists who generally advocated the notion that “no one should be liable to anyone for 
anything.” GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 15 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1995). 
As Gilmore explained, “[s]ince [that] ideal was not attainable, the compromise solution [in 
contract law] was to restrict liability within the narrowest possible limits.” Id.; see also id. at 
22–23, 47–49.  
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applicable procedural and evidentiary rules), and who will adjudicate their dispute.67 
As the Court has often remarked,  
the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed 
to do so nor does it prevent parties who do agree to arbitrate from 
excluding certain claims from the scope of their arbitration 
agreement. . . . Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not 
coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration 
agreements as they see fit.68  
In other words, autonomy consists in not being “prevent[ed]”—that is, in having the 
bare opportunity to make process choices without “coercion” by others or by the 
state.  
This conception of autonomy as negative liberty is apparent in several key 
arbitration decisions from the Court. Consider Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. 
Casarotto.69 There, the Court held that a Montana statute requiring arbitration clauses 
to be printed in underlined capital letters on the front page of the container contract 
was preempted by the FAA’s contrary injunction to “‘ensur[e] that private 
agreements to arbitrate’ are enforced according to their terms.”70 Critics of the 
decision argued that the statute should not have been preempted because it was 
actually consistent with the fundamental principle of “autonomy” in arbitration. For 
by bringing the clause to the immediate attention of the adherent, they claimed, the 
statute helped ensure that she would make a more informed and reasoned decision 
about arbitration (whatever that decision ultimately turned out to be).71 In rejecting 
this argument, the Court came down squarely on the side of negative liberty: states 
may not help weaker parties like the franchisees in Casarotto make better, more 
informed choices because paternalistic legislation of this sort does not improve 
anyone’s freedom. Instead, it compromises the drafting party’s freedom to enforce 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 683 (2010); Gary B. 
Born, Keynote Address: Arbitration and the Freedom To Associate, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 7, 16 (2009) (“If the parties desire a fast-track arbitration, one that is over and done within 
three months, they can agree to that. If the parties desire a documents-only arbitration, because 
they do not want to incur significant expense in having their dispute resolved, they can agree 
to that.” (footnote omitted)). 
 68. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
478–79 (1989) (citations omitted). This rationale is cited in one form or another in many 
of the Court’s recent decisions. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. 
Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749, 
1757 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 681–84; EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 
279, 293–94 (2002); see also Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2071 
(2013) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 69. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
 70. Id. at 688 (alteration in original) (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479). 
 71. See Edward Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration 
System: Choice and Preemption, in BRUNET ET AL., supra note 16, at 63, 69; Margaret L. 
Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535, 542 (2005); Sternlight, supra note 21, 
at 668 (arguing that the purpose of the FAA was to “promote arbitration that is knowingly 
selected by the parties”). 
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agreements that both parties chose willingly. On this view, freedom is better 
safeguarded by staying out of the parties’ business altogether.  
Consider also Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland 
Stanford Junior University.72 There, the parties had agreed to arbitrate under the 
California Arbitration Act (CAA), which permits courts to stay arbitration pending 
related litigation if “there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of 
law or fact.”73 By contrast, the FAA’s pro-arbitration approach requires courts to 
compel arbitration at once even if there are related claims pending in court that 
involve third parties to the arbitration agreement,74 which in turn helps promote 
recourse to the arbitral forum and further other values associated with arbitration, 
such as speed and efficiency.75 The question presented was whether the CAA’s stay 
provision stood as an obstacle to those purposes and objectives and thus should be 
preempted. The Court’s answer was that not even the pro-arbitration policies behind 
the FAA could trump the parties’ freedom of choice: “There is no federal policy 
favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is 
simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements 
to arbitrate.”76  
Volt reveals the extent of arbitration law’s commitment to the liberal principle of 
value neutrality: respect for party autonomy demands respecting the parties’ freedom 
to make even bad or irrational choices, such as by opting into state arbitration 
schemes that are less solicitous of arbitration than the FAA and thus arguably 
inconsistent with the “national policy favoring arbitration.”77 Many commentators 
share this assessment of arbitration law. Rau, for example, has argued that “[s]ince 
arbitration has no virtues other than what the parties themselves happen to find in it,” 
arbitration law forbids courts and legislatures from “imposing a particular image of 
arbitration on [the parties] against their will.”78 On this view, true freedom consists 
of the absence of constraints on the parties’ choices rather than the pursuit of good 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
 73. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(c) (West 2007); see also Volt, 489 U.S. at 471. 
 74. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).  
 75. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); see 
also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220–21 (1985). 
 76. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476; accord Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 
662, 683 (2010) (“[P]arties may agree to limit the issues they choose to arbitrate and may 
agree on rules under which any arbitration will proceed. They may choose who will resolve 
specific disputes . . . . [and they] may specify with whom they choose to arbitrate their 
disputes.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). 
 77. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 78. Alan Scott Rau, Fear of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 469, 479 (2006) (emphasis 
added); see also Bermann, supra note 19, at 1013 (“[T]he federal interest in arbitration does 
not consist of enforcing agreements to arbitrate according to some sort of abstract or ideal 
arbitral model, but rather according to the particular arbitral model upon which the parties had 
agreed.”).  
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choices.79 To the extent Volt and cases like it can be described as a “paean to party 
autonomy,”80 therefore, it is to autonomy qua negative liberty.  
Casarotto and Volt are not outliers; they are of a piece with the increasingly strong 
negative liberty and even libertarian orientation of the Court’s modern arbitration 
jurisprudence.81 In this jurisprudence, freedom of contract—in the sense of both 
maximal enforcement and minimal regulation—has become a paramount value.82  
2. Autonomy as Positive Liberty 
Although arbitration law takes the autonomy thesis as a straightforward claim 
about negative liberty, in arbitration scholarship the thesis has sometimes been 
conceived along the lines that “autonomy” has traditionally been understood in 
philosophical discourse: as suggesting a capacity for self-government more so than 
mere freedom from constraint. This is evident in the frequent claim that arbitration 
is a vehicle of “self-regulation”83 or “self-determination,”84 suggesting not so much 
a simple freedom to choose as a capacity to make sensible, informed, and reflective 
dispute-resolution choices that (ideally) result in something qualitatively superior to 
the default of litigation. Gary Born offers the following vivid—if perhaps 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) 
(“[A]rbitration is simply a matter of contract . . . ; it is a way to resolve those disputes—but 
only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.”); Volt, 489 U.S. at 
478; Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219. 
 80. See Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
225, 234 n.40 (1997). 
 81. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability after Doctor’s Associates, 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1996); accord Carbonneau, Contract 
Freedom, supra note 1, at 1195 (arguing that modern U.S. arbitration law has severely 
undercut “the role of the state and the prospect of state regulation”).  
 82. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 
331, 334 (criticizing the Court’s FAA jurisprudence as predicated on a “blind commitment to 
freedom of contract”); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: 
Whither Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1336–37 (1996) (arguing that the Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence has emphasized “freedom to contract” at the expense of “freedom from 
contract”); Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting out of 
Government’s Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 
529, 535 (1994) (“[T]he FAA’s core is freedom of contract with respect to arbitration 
agreements . . . .”).  
 83. FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS 4 (1st ed. 1948) (describing arbitration as a form of “self-regulation . . . [that] 
embodies the principles of independence, self-reliance, equality, integrity, and 
responsibility”); 1 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT § 3.2.1 (Supp. 1999). 
 84. Rau, supra note 1, at 486. In addition to arbitration, other types of contract procedures, 
such as choice-of-forum clauses, have also been justified based on the ideal of 
self-government. E.g., Martin H. Redish, Case One: Choice of Forum Clauses, 29 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 545, 548 (1995) (arguing that enforcement of forum selection clauses comports with 
“values of individual self-determination”). 
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counterfactual—description of how this type of thick positive liberty might manifest 
itself in a commercial arbitration agreement:  
[P]arties . . . take care to draft and tailor their dispute resolution 
mechanism specifically to suit their particular relationship. . . . [They] 
act to define and structure not just their dispute resolution mechanism, 
but also their underlying relationship itself; they act to safeguard their 
shared association with one another against the disputes which will 
inevitably arise and against the process of dispute resolution. Parties 
choose arbitration not just because of its characteristics as a dispute 
resolution mechanism, but because of their ability jointly to determine 
how the process of dispute resolution will affect their underlying 
relationship with one another.85 
Ironically, the best and strongest examples of a positive liberty interpretation of 
the autonomy thesis come from critics of so-called mandatory binding arbitration. 
For example, Paul Carrington and Paul Haagen argue that unsophisticated parties 
who enter pre-dispute arbitration agreements do not manifest “true” assent or 
“genuine” freedom of contract,86 either because they are unlikely to have read or 
understood the agreement or because they did not have the leverage to negotiate 
around it.87 The implication is that real freedom of contract in this context requires a 
certain capacity for autonomous decision making—a capacity that rarely exists in 
actual fact. Likewise, Margaret Jane Radin contends that by clicking “I agree” to 
boilerplate arbitration clauses, consumers are typically not acting independently or 
reflectively, and thus not autonomously.88 For Radin, freedom is just as much a 
function of internal constraints such as lack of information and cognitive biases as it 
is of external constraints such as duress.89 This is why she argues that the devolution 
of contractual assent from “true” consent to something like “fictional . . . opportunity 
to assent” or “constructive notice of terms”90 poses a serious problem for traditional, 
autonomy-based justifications for enforcement.  
A similar commitment to positive liberty drives longstanding efforts to amend the 
FAA, the latest expression of which is the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015 currently 
pending in Congress. The Act seeks to void only pre-dispute arbitration agreements, 
on the theory that when a party agrees to arbitrate before an actual dispute has arisen 
she has “no meaningful choice.”91 Only after the contours of a dispute become 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. Born, supra note 67, at 17 (emphasis added). 
 86. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 82, at 340; see also Sternlight, supra note 21, at 
675–77. 
 87. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 82, at 334–35, 340; see also Sternlight, supra note 
21, at 676–77.  
 88. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 88–90 (2013).  
 89. Id. at 23–29. Radin has elsewhere argued for market inalienability in particular 
contexts on the ground that it would be consistent with promoting positive liberty. Margaret 
Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1903–05 (1987). 
 90. RADIN, supra note 88, at 83. 
 91. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. § 2(3) (2015). 
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known, the argument goes, can a choice be “truly voluntary.”92 Note that in each of 
these cases, the claim is not necessarily that freedom of choice should be 
subordinated to other public values. Instead, the claim is that the exercise of that 
freedom will be qualitatively superior if certain (predispute) choices are removed.93  
In sharp contrast, libertarian or negative liberty defenders of arbitration law argue 
against drawing such distinctions about the quality of choice.94 To them, freedom is 
just the absence of coercion or duress.95 As long as nothing or nobody is preventing 
the consumer from “put[ting] the pen down without signing the form,” the consumer 
has acted freely and thus autonomously.96 Not even substantively unconscionable 
contracts or contracts procured by undue influence are “unfree,” on this view, for the 
simple reason that neither involves the type of external compulsion that rises to the 
level of duress.97  
Here it bears noting that positive liberty claims are not confined to the mandatory 
binding arbitration context. A good example is the work of Thomas Stipanowich, 
who is broadly supportive of arbitration. To be sure, Stipanowich sometimes wears 
his negative liberty stripes when he claims that the “opportunity for choice . . . is the 
one overriding value of arbitration, enabling arbitration to take many different forms 
and respond to many different needs and circumstances.”98 Otherwise put, “the single 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. Id. § 2(5). 
 93. See, e.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 82, at 339–46 (interpreting the old English 
revocability doctrine, by which a party could “revoke” pre-dispute arbitration agreements, as 
a means “to assure true assent”). 
 94. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 81, at 1033 (eschewing the question of what constitutes 
“meaningful choice”). 
 95. Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a 
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 201 n.23 (1998) 
[hereinafter Ware, Consumer Arbitration]. Ware’s precise claim here is that “[c]ontracting 
in the absence of duress is contracting voluntarily.” Id. Ware refers the reader at this juncture 
to another article, in which he essentially defines “voluntarily” to mean “freely” and its 
opposite to mean “coerced.” Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary 
Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 109 (1996) [hereinafter Ware, Employment Arbitration]. 
He argues that “one’s consent must be either voluntary or coerced; it cannot be both.” Id. 
Thus, any choice—no matter how poor, uninformed, or otherwise encumbered—is free just 
to the extent it is uncoerced. See id. at 109–13, 120–26. This is classic libertarianism. See, e.g., 
HAYEK, supra note 32, at 137 (arguing that “[e]ven if the threat of starvation to me and perhaps 
to my family impels me to accept a distasteful job at a very low wage, even if I am ‘at the 
mercy’ of the only man willing to employ me,” I am still free in the negative sense); NOZICK, 
supra note 40, at 262–64 (“A person’s choice among differing degrees of unpalatable 
alternatives is not rendered nonvoluntary by the fact that others voluntarily chose and acted 
within their rights in a way that did not provide him with a more palatable alternative.”). 
 96. Ware, Consumer Arbitration, supra note 95, at 201. 
 97. Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 95, at 127 (arguing that unconscionability 
reflects a determination that certain contracts should not be enforced “even though they are 
the product of voluntary consent”—that is, that “voluntary consent . . . [should be] 
subordinate[d] . . . to other values”). By the same token, because undue influence requires 
“unfair persuasion,” Ware believes it, too, is predicated on a substantive judgment about the 
type of contracts the law should enforce rather than on a (value-neutral) judgment about what 
counts as free choice. See id. at 127 n.226.  
 98. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial 
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most important advantage of binding arbitration” is “the flexibility to make 
arbitration what you want it to be”99—irrespective, that is, of your ability to exercise 
that freedom.  
But Stipanowich also recognizes that the mere “possibility of choice” does not 
necessarily translate into “real, practical choices.”100 For example, he reports that 
even sophisticated users such as business executives face significant hurdles to the 
meaningful exercise of autonomy, such as “lack of relevant knowledge,”101 bad 
habits or attitudes,102 “inexperience,” or the difficulty of having frank coversations 
about possible future conflicts.103 This leads him to conclude that “[f]or most 
business users,” real freedom of choice “is an illusion.”104  
Even when such users have the capability or resources to take full advantage of 
that freedom, Stipanowich laments that they typically choose not to do so.105 For 
example, they often delegate important decisions to others, such as transactional 
counsel, who give scant thought to dispute-resolution provisions until the eleventh 
hour106 or litigators who end up co-opting arbitration into little more than a privatized 
version of judicial procedure.107 In other words, they stop exercising all the qualities 
that Berlin identified of the autonomous agent: “to be a subject, not an object . . . 
deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature 
or by other men . . . conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them.”108 
As a result, the value proposition of “classic” arbitration is undermined. 
Unnecessarily contentious motion practice and discovery come to corrupt 
arbitration’s traditional emphasis on securing a speedy and effective hearing on the 
merits. Arbitration becomes the “new litigation.”109  
From a pure negative liberty standpoint that prizes value neutrality, it is difficult 
to understand Stipanowich’s complaint. Qua negative liberty, autonomy just means, 
“to each his own.” If the parties have chosen (without coercion) a process with all 
the trappings of full-bore litigation, or chosen to surrender that choice to their 
counsel, what is the problem? Brunet anticipated this precise rejoinder to 
Stipanowich more than a decade ago. Observing that parties were increasingly opting 
for a “judicialized” model of arbitration by agreeing to provisions for discovery, 
                                                                                                                 
 
Arbitration: Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 297, 316–17 
(2014) (emphasis added). 
 99. Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 51 (emphasis added).  
 100. Stipanowich, supra note 98, at 318; see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and 
Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation,” 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 386 (2009) 
(urging the need to “promote real choices in arbitration”). 
 101. Stipanowich, supra note 98, at 314.  
 102. Id. at 309. 
 103. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 388–90; Stipanowich, supra note 98, at 315–16. 
 104. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 386; accord Stipanowich, supra note 98, at 309 
(stating that even sophisticated parties are only nominally “choosing,” not choosing well or 
making good choices).  
 105. Stipanowich, supra note 98, at 314 (observing that parties “fail[] to take advantage of 
the choices inherent in arbitration”). 
 106. Id. at 314–15. 
 107. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 392. 
 108. BERLIN, supra note 30, at 131. 
 109. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 13. 
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motion practice, and even judicial review, Brunet argued that the autonomy thesis 
required honoring such choices no matter how much they ended up transforming 
arbitration into litigation.110  
It is only by construing the autonomy thesis as a claim about positive liberty that 
Stipanowich can draw the lines that he wishes to draw—that is, to claim that some 
choices are “good,” “worse,” or “better” than others.111 In other words, autonomy for 
Stipanowich is not just an opportunity concept; it is also an exercise concept. It is 
precisely because he has a conception of what exercising true or meaningful 
autonomy is and why it is valuable that Stipanowich can urge parties to “exert greater 
control over their destiny in arbitration,”112 to “be more deliberate in taking 
advantage of the spectrum of available choices,”113 and to have access to greater 
“discernment[,] . . . . knowledge, experience, and sound judgment” in arbitration 
matters.114  
II. DOES THE AUTONOMY THESIS EXPLAIN THE RIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT OF 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS?  
Why is it important whether the autonomy thesis is construed as a claim about 
negative or positive liberty? The answer has to do with the fact that “autonomy” has 
been the principal policy rationale to support the proposition that arbitration 
agreements must be enforced strictly “‘according to their terms.’”115 For example, 
Ware argues that enforcing arbitration clauses “advances the parties’ freedom to 
define their legal rights and obligations as they wish.”116 Brunet reasons that “[i]n a 
state such as ours characterized by the respect for individual liberty, courts should 
enforce customized agreements to arbitrate and the legislature should regulate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. Brunet, supra note 12, at 45, 84–86. Brunet’s negative liberty orientation in this 
context is in sharp tension with the positive liberty orientation he adopts in his defense of the 
Montana statute at issue in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). See 
supra note 71 and accompanying text. This tends to confirm my observation that courts and 
commentators have used crucial terms like “autonomy” without attempting to understand what 
it really means and what it requires.  
 111. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 394, 400; Stipanowich, supra note 98, at 309 
(lamenting “the habits and attitudes of business ‘users’ and counsel” that often prevent 
“making good choices regarding arbitration” (emphasis added)). 
 112. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 401. 
 113. Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 52. 
 114. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 436.   
 115. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (quoting 
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)); 
accord Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995) (“[T]he basic 
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts’ refusals to enforce agreements 
to arbitrate.”); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) . 
 116. Ware, supra note 82, at 555; see also Brunet, supra note 12, at 84 (arguing for broad 
“party autonomy to fashion arbitration procedures deemed essential by the contracting 
partners”); Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 95, at 86 (“[C]ontemporary arbitration 
law . . . is well-suited to ensure that disputes are resolved by arbitration only when the 
disputants have voluntarily consented to that. The argument was that contract law enforces 
only duties assumed through voluntary consent . . . .”). 
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minimally.”117 In Stipanowich’s view, modern arbitration statutes such as the FAA 
strengthened the enforcement of arbitration agreements in order to promote party 
autonomy.118  
For these and other commentators, enforcement follows naturally—even 
axiomatically—from a commitment to the autonomy thesis. The animating idea 
appears to be that enforcement does little more than respect or give effect to the 
parties’ free choices. The corollary is that when the state regulates arbitration 
agreements, it imposes external values that invariably frustrate those choices. But as 
we shall see, depending on how one understands “autonomy,” the autonomy thesis 
may or may not support enforcing arbitration agreements; indeed, most of the time it 
appears to require just the opposite.  
My analysis will have implications for contract theory more generally, which also 
appeals to autonomy as an affirmative argument for enforcement. But the precise 
conclusion I draw is less problematic for contract theory than it is for the Court’s 
arbitration jurisprudence for at least two reasons. First, contract theory’s more 
eclectic foundations mean that there is no widespread consensus on the notion that 
the value of autonomy trumps all other values—that is, there is no equivalent of an 
“autonomy thesis.” Instead, contract theory candidly acknowledges the limitations 
of a pure autonomy-based justification for enforcement and recognizes the 
importance of other normative commitments, such as efficiency, equity, and the 
morality of promising. Second, contract theory is not committed to minimizing state 
regulation—and thus to “rigorous” enforcement—in quite the same way as the 
Court’s modern arbitration jurisprudence. State legislation and public policy 
currently make contracts unenforceable in a wide variety of contexts (consumer, 
insurance, investment, and landlord-tenant, to name a few). Thus, contract theory 
appreciates that valuing autonomy does not require untrammeled enforcement.  
But the tension between autonomy and enforcement becomes a much bigger 
problem in the arbitration area. First, until recently, alternative rationales for 
enforcement have played a comparatively minor role in arbitration jurisprudence. For 
example, the autonomy thesis has led the Court to hold that autonomy arguments 
always trump efficiency arguments.119 Second, arbitration agreements are enforced 
even more stringently than other contracts. For example, FAA preemption means 
that arbitration agreements are effectively immune from state legislation and public 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. Brunet, supra note 16, at 5. 
 118. Stipanowich, supra note 18, at 430 (“Arbitration law promotes the autonomy of 
parties by enforcing their agreements to arbitrate . . . .”).  
 119. See, e.g., Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 (enforcing arbitration clause despite defendant’s 
argument that doing so would create inefficiencies in the form of conflicting rulings on a 
common issue of law or fact); Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 220–21 (enforcing arbitration clause 
despite plaintiff’s argument that doing so would result in delay and other inefficiencies); 
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (enforcing 
arbitration clause despite plaintiff’s argument that compelling arbitration was inefficient 
because it would require related disputes to be resolved in separate arbitral and judicial forums 
rather than being consolidated before a court of law). In its more recent jurisprudence, 
however, the Court has shown an increasing solicitude for efficiency values. See AT&T 
Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (describing freedom of contract 
as a means to the end of efficiency). 
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policy, which ordinarily render contracts unenforceable in a wide variety of 
settings.120 In addition, FAA section 4 effectively requires courts to grant specific 
performance upon proof of a valid arbitration agreement,121 whereas in most other 
contexts courts retain the discretion to withhold such equitable remedies.122 For these 
and other reasons, many commentators now contend that arbitration agreements have 
evolved into a kind of “super contract.”123 But if autonomy does not point 
unproblematically in the direction of enforcement to begin with, it is difficult to 
appreciate why arbitration agreements should be enforced even more stringently than 
contracts generally.  
A. Negative Liberty and the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements  
As explained in Part I.B, arbitration law conceives of the autonomy thesis largely 
in negative liberty terms. But negative liberty presents at best an awkward 
justification for the rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements.124  
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1271–72.  
 121. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 218 (“By its terms, the Act leaves no 
place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts 
shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement 
has been signed.” (emphasis in original)); see also Philip G. Phillips, A Lawyer’s Approach to 
Commercial Arbitration, 44 YALE L.J. 31, 33 (1934) (reasoning that the FAA’s mandatory 
language prevents courts from “refus[ing] specific performance of arbitration on grounds 
which heretofore have influenced chancellors and legal scholars to favor refusal of equitable 
relief”); Sidney P. Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 
160, 164, 172 (1934) (arguing that the FAA mandates specific performance for arbitration 
agreements, leaving no room for the court’s exercise of equitable discretion); Legislation, 
Statutory Tinkering with Specific Performance, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1036, 1041 (1934) 
(observing that “the discretion of the equity court has been strikingly narrowed by statutes 
which purport to make mandatory the granting of specific performance of arbitration”). 
 122. 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357(1) (1981) (“Subject to the rules 
stated in §§ 359–69, specific performance of a contract duty will be granted in the discretion 
of the court . . . .”); id. § 357 cmt. c (“The granting of equitable relief has traditionally been 
regarded as within judicial discretion.”). 
 123. Tom Carbonneau, A Comment upon Professor Park’s Analysis of the Dicta in First 
Options v. Kaplan, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., Nov. 1996, at 18, 19 (“Kaplan and its 
antecedents convert arbitration agreements into ‘super’ contracts of adjudication that can 
dislodge entirely the operation of law from private litigation.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, 
Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997) 
(“[T]oday, the agreement to arbitrate is effectively a ‘superclause’ that is specifically 
enforceable even in the face of allegations that the contract of which it is a part was induced 
by fraud or is otherwise avoidable.”); David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by 
Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of 
Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1127–37 (2002) (describing pre-litigation 
agreements, in particular arbitration agreements, as super contracts because they are routinely 
enforced through specific performance and because traditional contract and public policy 
defenses have had limited effect). See generally Richard Frankel, The Arbitration Clause as 
Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 531 (2014). 
 124. Others have made the same observation outside the arbitration context. See, e.g., 
Brilmayer, supra note 36. 
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Negative liberty arguments are most persuasive as against regulation that 
prohibits or prevents people from doing as they please—for example, when the state 
subjects certain conduct to tortious or criminal liability. But as I argue in Part II.A.1 
below, when the state regulates arbitration agreements (such as through 
consumer-protection statutes or other measures) it typically does not impose any 
legal constraints on action; instead, it merely refuses to help one party enforce an 
agreement that fails to comply with the regulation. Both parties remain negatively 
free to follow through with the agreement if they so desire. Enforcement, in other 
words, is a type of state assistance rather than interference. Regulation making 
arbitration agreements unenforceable is just the withdrawal of that assistance and, 
for that reason, does not in any meaningful sense restrict negative liberty.  
In Part II.A.2, I argue that negative liberty arguments are even less persuasive 
when it comes to making the affirmative case for enforcing arbitration agreements. 
Negative liberty theorists make it seem as if enforcement simply leaves the parties 
free to do as they wish. But the reality is that in practically any action for 
enforcement, one party no longer wishes to be bound. It is difficult to explain how 
coercing that party to arbitrate is consistent with her negative liberty; to the contrary, 
negative liberty would appear more consistent with the freedom to change one’s 
mind.  
1. Regulating Enforcement Does Not Compromise Negative Liberty  
In a seminal essay, Richard Epstein argued that when a court refuses to enforce a 
contract for reasons that go to the substance of the bargain, it “impos[es] upon the 
parties its own views about their rights and duties.”125 Rather than simply leaving the 
parties where it finds them, it actually interferes with their freedom of action 
conceived in negative terms. Epstein explains: 
One of the first functions of the law is to guarantee to individuals a sphere 
of influence in which they will be able to operate, without having to 
justify themselves to the state or to third parties: if one individual is 
entitled to do within the confines of the tort law what he pleases with 
what he owns, then two individuals who operate with those same 
constraints should have the same right with respect to their mutual 
affairs against the rest of the world.126 
From this, Epstein concludes that contracts should be enforced with minimal 
(substantive) regulation by the state.  
The Epstein quotation exemplifies a common tendency to write as if the law 
should guarantee maximal enforcement to contracts between two individuals for 
much the same reason that it guarantees each individual maximal freedom from 
regulation other than tort law. The trouble is that enforcing a contract is hardly the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 
293 (1975) (emphasis added).  
 126. Id. at 293–94 (emphasis added).  
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same thing as allowing individuals to associate with one another.127 It is one thing to 
argue that if a tenant of a residential apartment building is free to play Bach partitas 
past 11:00 p.m., two tenants should also be free to combine and play Bartok duets 
past 11:00 p.m. For here, one person’s freedom from restrictive rules about noise is 
simply being extended to permit a like freedom to two persons. But it is quite another 
to argue that when two tenants make a contract to play Bartok duets sometime in the 
future, neither of them is free unilaterally to change her mind at a later point in time. 
At most, promoting the first tenant’s negative liberty would require that two tenants 
should not be prohibited from playing or planning to play together after 11:00 p.m., 
not that the landlord (or perhaps even the state) should marshal its resources to 
enforce their agreement to play in the future.  
H. L. A. Hart’s distinction between “duty-imposing” and “power-conferring” 
rules provides a helpful framework for unpacking this argument. As Hart describes 
them, duty-imposing rules are non-optional in the sense that they “set[] up and 
defin[e] certain kinds of conduct as something to be avoided or done by those to 
whom it applies, irrespective of their wishes.”128 This is what gives such rules the 
structure of “orders backed by threats.”129 Good examples are negligent torts and 
antidiscrimination law, both of which define certain acts or transactions as a wrong 
subject to compensation or penalties.130  
By contrast, power-conferring rules “provide individuals with facilities for 
realizing their wishes, by conferring legal powers upon them to create, by certain 
specified procedures and subject to certain conditions, structures of rights and duties 
within the coercive framework of the law.”131 Good examples include the law of 
contracts and the rules of civil procedure.132 There are no ex ante duties to create 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. In the arbitration context, Gary Born makes an argument similar to Epstein’s when he 
links the development of arbitration law in the West with the increasing emphasis not so much 
on individual but rather on “associational” liberty. See Born, supra note 67, at 15–21. On this 
view, the purpose of arbitration law would appear to be to leave the parties largely free to 
“associate” (i.e., structure their arbitration process) as they see fit, with limited interference by 
the state. To support this argument, Born traces the history of arbitration to trade associations, 
medieval guilds, religious communities, and other groups for whom arbitration guaranteed 
“maximum autonomy and control over the resolution of their disputes.” Id. at 17. 
But the crux of modern arbitration law is to enforce arbitration agreements and awards 
against reluctant parties—that is, to sever the parties’ association and facilitate an accounting 
of who owes what to whom. It is plainly not to stay out of the parties’ business altogether, as 
it once might have been in the case of self-regulating associations that enforced arbitration 
agreements and awards internally, without recourse to courts of law.  
 128. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27 (2d ed. 1994). 
 129. Id. at 28.  
 130. See id. at 26–38 (defining a duty-imposing rule as a rule the disobedience of which is 
a wrong subject to punishment or compensation). Duty-imposing rules can take the form of a 
mandatory or a default rule. Antidiscrimination statutes can be thought of as a species of the 
former because parties generally may not defeat the application of such laws through private 
agreement. Negligent torts are an example of the latter insofar as parties are generally free to 
contract around the duty of due care through exculpatory clauses.  
 131. Id. at 27–28 (emphasis added). The italicized portion highlights what makes this a 
power-conferring rule rather than just the conferral of power. 
 132. Id. at 28–34. Gregory Klass has significantly refined Hart’s somewhat sweeping 
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enforceable exchange relationships or bring an action in court; it is only to the extent 
that parties wish to avail themselves of these forms of state assistance that they must 
adhere to power-conferring rules such as contract doctrine, the rules of judicial 
procedure, and other applicable legislation. A landlord who wishes to create an 
enforceable contract, for instance, must (inter alia) refrain from making certain 
misrepresentations and comply with applicable landlord-tenant statutes.133 Failing to 
do so simply means that the state will not assist the landlord in enforcing the contract; 
it does not constitute a “wrong” to which a sanction attaches.134  
Sitting as it does at the crossroads of contract and procedure, arbitration law 
consists largely of power-conferring rules—that is, of rules that stipulate the 
conditions precedent for courts to enforce arbitration agreements and awards.135 
Duty-imposing rules are largely beside the point in this arena because no state 
currently makes it a crime or a tort to arbitrate disputes or to include or omit certain 
provisions in arbitration agreements.136  
                                                                                                                 
 
assimilation of contract law to power-conferring rules. Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of 
Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726 (2008) (arguing that 
contract law is in truth a set of compound rules that exhibit both power-conferring and 
duty-imposing features). 
 133. See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981) (misrepresentation); id. 
§ 178 (public policy).  
 134. See HART, supra note 128, at 33–34. For a more detailed argument for why breach of 
contract does not constitute a “wrong” in the first place, see infra notes 171–77 and 
accompanying text. 
 135. The FAA itself, like other so-called modern U.S. arbitration statutes, is a set of 
power-conferring rules. Its chief innovation was to assist parties in enforcing arbitration 
agreements in a particular way—namely, through specific performance as a matter of right. 
See Hiro N. Aragaki, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the Antidiscrimination Theory of 
FAA Preemption, 4 PENN. ST. Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 39, 46 (2013); Aragaki, supra note 23, 
at 1947–49; see also Sales and Contracts To Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and 
Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 6 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Hearing] (question of Sen. 
Thomas Walsh) (“[The purpose of the FAA was] to overcome the rule of equity, that equity 
will not specifically enforce any arbitration agreement[.]”). The newfound availability of 
specific performance for arbitration agreements simply opened up more meaningful avenues 
of state assistance, such as in compelling arbitration, in staying existing litigation, and in 
barring new litigation on the same subject. 
The old common-law revocability doctrine—the doctrine that the FAA was designed to 
overturn—was also a power-conferring rule. It did not make arbitration or arbitration 
agreements illegal, since even prior to the New York Arbitration Law of 1920 parties were 
free to enter pre-dispute arbitration agreements, follow through with them on their own accord, 
obtain money damages in case of breach, and have any resulting award enforced as a judgment 
of the court. Toledo S.S. Co. v. Zenith Transp. Co., 184 F. 391, 398–400 (6th Cir. 1911) 
(holding that arbitration agreement may not be revoked after entry of award); Tobey v. Cnty. 
of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065) (Story, J.) (same); Conn. 
Fire Ins. Co. v. O’Fallon, 69 N.W. 118, 119 (Neb. 1896) (same). It simply made the power to 
enforce an executory arbitration agreement using the remedy of specific performance 
conditional on neither party revoking the agreement prior to an award.  
 136. There are, however, duty-imposing rules governing certain incidents of the arbitration 
process, such as bribing an arbitrator. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 570.150 (West 1999 & 
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Duty-imposing rules are a palpable restriction on negative liberty. An employer 
subject to antidiscrimination laws is no longer free to hire or fire employees in any 
way it wishes. Likewise, the duty of due care restricts our freedom to be careless, 
irresponsible, and unreasonable in ways that injure or annoy others. But it is much 
harder to appreciate how power-conferring rules likewise constrain autonomy qua 
negative liberty. Rather than restrict freedom of choice, power-conferring rules allow 
individuals to do what they could not do without state assistance—that is, they make 
more choice possible. The rules themselves do not deprive persons of a bare freedom 
to act;137 their effect is simply to withdraw certain benefits from parties who do not 
comply with them.138 This leads contracts scholar Stephen Smith to conclude that 
“[r]efusing to enforce a contract is not an interference with [negative] freedom” at 
all.139 
Consider again the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015. If passed, the effect of the 
Act would be to place further conditions on the parties’ ability to avail themselves of 
FAA section 2—namely, arbitration agreements involving consumers and employees 
will qualify for enforcement only if they were formed post-dispute.140 The Act is 
therefore a power-conferring rule rather than a duty-imposing rule: nothing in the 
Act prevents consumers and large service providers such as AT&T from entering 
arbitration agreements and following through with them if they so desire. The Act 
merely provides that the state will not help one party enforce an arbitration agreement 
or award in certain circumstances.141  
                                                                                                                 
 
Supp. 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-5-7 (LexisNexis 2014).  
  137. See SMITH, supra note 66, at 257 (making the same argument with regard to rules that 
refuse enforcement of prostitution contracts); Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why 
Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 111–12 (2002) (making the 
same argument in the context of discussing the basic compatibility between inalienability rules 
and liberal theory). 
It bears noting that, historically, freedom of contract arguments were often directed against 
duty-imposing rules rather than power-conferring rules. Adam Smith, for example, argued 
against criminal usury laws on the ground that they violated the “natural liberty” of free 
exchange. ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 263 (Charles J. Bullock ed., Cosimo Classics 
2007). Likewise, in the celebrated case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court 
held that a penal statute making it a misdemeanor, inter alia, for a baked-goods establishment 
to “require[] or permit[]” employees to work more than a certain number of hours per week, 
id. at 46, was unconstitutional because it “interfer[ed] with their independence of judgment 
and of action,” understood as the right to enter more so than enforce the contract, id. at 57. 
 138. See HART, supra note 128, at 34; SMITH, supra note 66, at 264–65 (discussing the 
view that contract enforcement is a state-provided service, “in much the same way that the 
state provides educational, recreational, or police services”). 
 139. SMITH, supra note 66, at 257. It is perhaps for this reason that the liberal tradition has 
generally not considered the enforcement of contracts to be on par with basic rights of the 
individual, such as freedom of conscience or freedom of association. See Freeman, supra note 
137, at 108–09. 
 140. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015). 
 141. A similar point can be made about the common-law public policy defense, which 
makes criminal or illegal contracts unenforceable. For many centuries, courts have justified 
the defense on the ground that when the parties are in pari delicto, the plaintiff has “no right 
to be assisted,” for “[n]o [c]ourt will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon 
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Negative liberty theorists like Epstein sometimes elide the important distinction 
between duty-imposing and power-conferring rules, which in turn helps them co-opt 
straightforward autonomy arguments against the former into arguments against the 
latter. As a result, power-conferring rules are misleadingly portrayed as a form of 
active interference with private ordering, when in fact they merely place conditions 
on the receipt of state benefits.142 Arguing against power-conferring rules such as the 
Arbitration Fairness Act then comes to epitomize a “hands off,” laissez-faire 
position, when in fact it is just the opposite.143  
The doctrine of FAA preemption provides a good example of this confusion. 
Pursuant to this doctrine, any state law that “‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution’” of the FAA’s purposes will be displaced or 
preempted.144 Because the Court construes the FAA’s overriding purpose to be the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements strictly according to their terms, the FAA 
preempts any state law that impedes the enforcement of arbitration agreements.145 
The only exceptions are “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract,” typically understood to mean common-law contract defenses.146  
Courts and commentators often improperly characterize enforcement-impeding 
state laws as restrictive or coercive, which in turn enables them to appeal to negative 
liberty when justifying FAA preemption. Take AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,147 in 
which the issue was whether the FAA should preempt an unconscionability 
precedent set by the California high court in Discover Bank v. Superior Court.148 
Discover Bank held that collective-action waivers were unconscionable when 
contained in certain types of consumer adhesion contracts.149 It was therefore in the 
nature of a power-conferring rule: compliance was necessary only to the extent the 
drafter of an arbitration clause sought state assistance through enforcement.  
                                                                                                                 
 
an immoral or an illegal act.” Holman v. Johnson, [1775] 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B.) 
(emphasis added); see also Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1907 (2011) 
(“‘[A] court will not, on grounds of public policy, aid a promisee by enforcing the promise, . . . . 
It will simply leave both parties as it finds them . . . .’” (quoting 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 197 cmt. a (1979))); McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669–70 (1899) (stating 
that courts will “refuse to grant either party to an illegal contract judicial aid for the enforcement 
of his alleged rights under it” and “will leave the parties as it finds them”).  
 142. See, e.g., infra notes 150–54, 213–14 and accompanying text; infra note 216.  
 143. This is just another iteration of the same move in other domains such as classical legal 
thought and libertarianism, which have been skillfully exposed by many others. See, e.g., G.A. 
COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY 56–61 (1995) (libertarianism); Freeman, 
supra note 137, at 132 (libertarianism); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 491 (1923) (classical legalism). 
 144. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). For a more extensive discussion of FAA preemption, 
see Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1241–48. 
 145. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1242–45. 
 146. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1245–47. 
 147. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  
 148. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.  
 149. See id. at 1110.  
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Nonetheless, the Court portrayed Discover Bank as a duty-imposing rule—as a 
“prohibition on collective-action waivers”150 that “superimpose[d]” or “require[d]” 
class proceedings regardless of the parties’ explicit choice to the contrary.151 This 
enabled the Court to reason that Discover Bank constituted an unwarranted 
restriction or invasion of the parties’ freedom,152 and thus an affront to the autonomy 
thesis. But as the Court was ultimately forced to concede, Discover Bank does not 
actually “require” anything153—it merely withdraws the power to enforce class 
waivers against a now reluctant party. Willing parties remain free to honor class 
waivers despite Discover Bank, such as by refraining from bringing representative 
actions.154 
2. Enforcement Compromises the Negative Liberty of the Party Who No Longer 
Wishes To Arbitrate 
If the autonomy thesis is a claim about negative liberty, there is yet a further, 
more acute problem when the thesis is used affirmatively to justify enforcement. 
Courts and commentators assume that enforcement is non-coercive because it 
merely “give[s] effect to the intent of the parties,”155 “advances the parties’ 
freedom to define their legal rights and obligations as they wish,”156 or gives 
                                                                                                                 
 
 150. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (emphasis added).  
 151. Id. at 1752–53.  
 152. Id. at 1748–49 (explaining that parties enjoy wide “discretion in designing arbitration 
processes,” such as to select applicable procedural rules and to choose arbitrators with 
expertise in a given field). As the Court noted, the parties were free to choose even unwise 
procedures that dilute the speed and efficiency gains ordinarily to be expected from arbitration. 
For example, they “could agree to arbitrate pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
or pursuant to a discovery process rivaling that in litigation.” Id. at 1752 (emphasis in original). 
 153. Id. at 1750 (emphasis in original). Others have also noted this sleight of hand. See, 
e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 435, 526–27 & n.308 (2011); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 707 (2012). 
 154. The Court made the same move when announcing the doctrine of FAA preemption 
for the first time in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). Southland involved the 
California Franchise Investment Law (CFIL), which purported to void agreements to arbitrate 
CFIL claims. Id. at 3. Reasoning that the CFIL was preempted by the FAA, the Court 
nonetheless enforced the parties’ arbitration clause. It justified this decision in part by 
characterizing the CFIL as restricting autonomy qua negative liberty because it “require[d] a 
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by 
arbitration.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added). But the CFIL did not force parties to litigate against 
their will; willing parties remained free to settle their disputes through arbitration. The CFIL 
merely withdrew state assistance in compelling arbitration when one party refused to 
cooperate.  
 155. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (emphasis 
added); accord Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 458 (2003); Volt Info. Scis., 
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472 (1989) (describing 
enforcement as honoring the parties’ “liberty to choose the terms under which they will 
arbitrate”). 
 156. Ware, supra note 82, at 555 (emphasis added); accord Brunet, supra note 16, at 6 
(arguing that enforcement “contributes to party autonomy by upholding the intent of the 
2016] AUTONOMY AND RIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT 1169 
 
“expression [to] private parties’ desires to control, to the maximum extent 
possible, the nature and character of their underlying relationship.”157 But it cannot 
be overemphasized that enforcing a contract typically does not honor the intention 
of both parties. To be sure, the parties may have been uncoerced at the time they 
entered the contract (let us call this T1). But in the case of predispute arbitration 
agreements, enforcement typically does not happen until a much later point in time 
(let us call this T2). At T2, it is almost certainly the case that the contract no longer 
expresses the wishes of one party—otherwise there would be no occasion for 
enforcement to begin with.  
There are of course limited exceptions, such as where the court’s active 
cooperation or assistance is required in order to effectuate performance.158 Consider 
a predispute agreement to alter the standard for granting summary judgment under 
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Here it is possible to imagine a 
situation—however unlikely—in which (i) both parties continue to desire their 
chosen procedural alteration at T2 but (ii) the court nonetheless refuses to honor it for 
reasons of public policy. Scholars who argue in favor of viewing the Federal Rules 
as default rules typically take this situation as their paradigm case, which in turn 
helps them argue for a broad right to customize litigation procedures.159 After all, if 
both parties reaffirm their choice at T2, it becomes harder to justify disregarding that 
choice from either an autonomy or a Pareto-efficiency standpoint.  
Another apt example relates to so-called back-end enforcement of agreements to 
alter the grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards. FAA section 10 provides for vacatur 
only upon proof of procedural irregularities such as arbitrator bias or a refusal to hear 
material evidence.160 In Hall Street Associates v. Mattel,161 the parties sought to 
                                                                                                                 
 
parties in their choice of arbitration procedure” (emphasis added)). 
 157. Born, supra note 67, at 20 (emphasis added). 
 158. Bob Bone refers to procedures contemplated by such agreements as “Type III” 
procedures. See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party 
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1339–40 (2012). 
 159. Thus, Henry Noyes argues that because the parties jointly “own” the dispute, “it is 
hard to accept that there is some fundamental unfairness in the parties’ agreement to adopt and 
apply mutually agreed-upon litigation procedures.” Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They 
Will Come: Contracts To Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 620 (2007). Fair enough if both parties remain in agreement at T2. But 
if not, the argument in favor of enforcement against a reluctant party is far from 
straightforward on either efficiency or autonomy grounds. Likewise, Michael Moffitt’s 
well-known argument in favor of viewing the Federal Rules as default rather than mandatory 
nonenforcement rules is fueled almost entirely by examples in which both parties are assumed 
to be in agreement at T2. See, e.g., Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for 
Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 472–73 (2007) (arguing that 
if each side agrees not to object on hearsay grounds to the other’s expert’s testimony, there is 
little reason to refuse enforcement). Indeed, Moffitt excludes from consideration contexts such 
as mandatory binding arbitration, which involve adhesive agreements and a significant 
“temporal distance between the agreement and its implementation”—contexts that are most 
likely to produce disagreement about enforcement at T2. Id. at 481 (“Broad, anticipatory 
customization is not what I envision.”). 
 160. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4) (2012).  
 161. 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
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contract around section 10 by providing that awards could also be vacated for errors 
of law. Following issuance of the arbitrator’s award, both parties filed cross-motions 
to vacate for legal error on the basis of their contract. In other words, both reaffirmed 
their agreement at T2; they just disagreed about what specific error had been 
committed. A motion to enforce the agreement was still necessary, however, because 
the parties required the court’s cooperation to conduct a heightened review, which 
some courts had refused.162 These examples highlight the fact that even willing 
parties are sometimes unable to execute their agreement without active assistance 
from the courts.163 In such cases, the assumption of bilateral consent at T2—however 
implausible as a factual matter—would appear warranted.  
But the same is not true with respect to the front-end enforcement of arbitration 
clauses under FAA section 2 or 4, which has been the central issue in almost all of 
the Court’s game-changing arbitration decisions over the past five decades.164 Where 
both parties remain in agreement after a dispute arises, there is no need for court 
intervention because the parties will submit to their chosen arbitration process of 
their own accord. In any legal action brought under section 2 or 4, therefore, at least 
one party resists enforcement in part or in whole. This has two important implications 
for the claim that enforcement promotes the parties’ autonomy qua negative liberty.  
First, enforcement reduces the breaching party’s negative liberty because it is 
plainly coercive.165 The point is even more forceful in the arbitration context because 
the principal means of enforcing arbitration agreements is not through a liability rule 
(i.e., money damages) but rather through a much more coercive set of property 
rules166: (i) specific performance, which requires the breaching party to submit to 
arbitration on pain of having a default judgment entered against her,167 and (ii) an 
injunction barring access to the courts.168 Negative liberty theorists typically fail to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 162. It was only on appeal that Mattel “switched horses” and argued that the FAA vacatur 
standards were mandatory. See id. at 580. 
 163. This is especially true of procedural contracts, where the requested remedy is typically 
specific performance. Courts have the discretion to deny specific performance if it would 
“impose on the court burdens in . . . supervision that are disproportionate to the advantages to 
be gained from enforcement.” 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 366 (1981). 
 164. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) 
(nonarbitrability and vindication of rights); AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
1740 (2011) (preemption); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) 
(separability and delegation); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) 
(delegation); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) 
(nonarbitrability); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (preemption); Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (separability); Wilko v. Swan, 346 
U.S. 427 (1953) (nonarbitrability). The only exceptions appear to be Hall Street, 552 U.S. 576, 
and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 165. See SMITH, supra note 66, at 258 (“By their very nature, contractual obligations 
restrict individual autonomy. Indeed, they represent one of the few ways by which a private 
individual may legally restrict the future freedom of another.” (emphasis added)).  
 166. On the distinction between property and liability rules, see Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  
 167. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
 168. See id. § 3. 
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address the coerciveness of enforcement because they treat executory contracts as 
simultaneous transactions—that is, they elide the crucial distinction between T1 and 
T2.169 This leads them to assume that if there is no coercion at the time the adherent 
enters the contract (T1), there is ipso facto no coercion at T2, because T1 = T2. By 
contrast, critics of mandatory binding arbitration are apt to highlight this distinction, 
as when they argue against the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements where lack 
of understanding, optimistic overconfidence, or weak bargaining power at T1 
typically lead the adherent to take a different view of her agreement at T2. The thrust 
of their critique is not so much that consumers and employees are “coerced” or 
“forced” at T1 when they are presented with an arbitration clause on a 
“take-it-or-leave-it” basis; instead, it is that even if there were something short of 
coercion at T1, there was certainly coercion at T2.170 
Second, it is difficult to see how enforcement safeguards the nonbreaching party’s 
negative liberty. Negative liberty might be improved when we protect someone from 
harm or misfeasance—for example, from tortious interference with her person or 
property. But as we saw, it is not improved when we protect her from nonfeasance 
or, in what is the same thing, when we assist her in ways that we believe are wise, 
good, or beneficial.171 Enforcing a wholly executory contract is more akin to the latter 
than it is to the former. The reason is that, absent unjust enrichment or detrimental 
reliance, breach is just the failure to fulfill the promise of a future benefit, which is 
to say that it is more in the nature of an omission than active misfeasance.172 And if 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. This elision is also what causes some commentators erroneously to rest the case for 
contract enforcement on Pareto efficiency. A simultaneous voluntary transaction is a reliable 
indication of a move to Pareto-superior states of welfare in a way that a deferred transaction 
that requires enforcement is not. The reason is that the Pareto standard cannot explain why the 
breaching party’s revealed preference at T2 does not trump her revealed preference at T1, and 
thus why a contract should be enforced over the present objection of one party. See infra note 
256. It matters little that the breaching party may have changed her mind at T2 
opportunistically or that she may never have intended to perform the contract to begin with. 
The Pareto standard is a measure of utility not morality. See, e.g., VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL 
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 13 (Ann S. Schwier & Alfred N. Page eds., Ann S. Schwier trans., 
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1971) (1906) (arguing that it is an “error” to critique the study 
of political economy for “not taking morality into account. It is like accusing a theory of the 
game of chess of not taking culinary art into account.”). 
 170. This is the argument behind longstanding efforts to amend the FAA to make 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable, inter alia, in the consumer and employment 
contexts. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. (2015); 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013); Arbitration Fairness 
Act of 2011, S. 987, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 
H.R 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, H.R. 3010, 110th 
Cong. (2007).  
 171. On the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance, see Peter Benson, Contract, 
in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 29, 32 (Dennis Patterson ed., 
1996). 
 172. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 141–43 (1991); EMILE 
DURKHEIM, ON THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 217 (George Simpson ed., trans., 
Macmillan Co. 1933) (1893) (arguing that by breaching a contract, “I do not enrich myself at 
the expense of another; I only refuse to be useful to him”); cf. SMITH, supra note 66, at 140 
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so, enforcement merely helps the nonbreaching party realize a benefit or satisfy her 
expectations; it does not deter or compensate for any actual interference with her 
freedom.173  
The same is not necessarily true, of course, where the nonbreaching party has 
partially performed and thereby either unjustly enriched the other party174 or relied 
to her detriment.175 Enforcement in these circumstances does not simply further an 
interest in keeping promises; it improves the nonbreaching party’s freedom from 
unjust detention of her property176 and tortious conduct,177 respectively. But neither 
situation captures what is typically at stake in the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.  
One reason is that, according to the Court’s own “separability” doctrine, 
arbitration clauses are conceived as stand-alone contracts whose validity or 
enforceability does not depend on the validity or enforceability of the larger contract 
in which they are contained.178 At the moment of breach, the arbitration clause (as 
distinct from the container contract) is typically wholly executory; as to that clause, 
reliance and restitution do not provide persuasive grounds to justify enforcement.179 
                                                                                                                 
 
(“An act of nonfeasance, such as failing to give to charity, may reveal the actor as lacking in 
virtue . . . but it raises no question of rights, and hence is not a proper subject for legal 
regulation [on individual-autonomy grounds].”).  
 173. This is the sense in which Lon Fuller and William Perdue argued that enforcing a 
contract in these circumstances using the remedy of expectation damages amounts to a “queer 
kind of ‘compensation.’” L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in 
Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53 (1936). 
 174. An example would be a contract between A and B for the sale of goods, payment on 
credit. If A delivers the goods at the time the contract is formed (T1) but B refuses to pay for 
them at T2, A has a compelling claim of misfeasance: A has suffered a tangible loss (parting 
with the goods) and B has gained a corresponding benefit that does not rightfully belong to 
her.  
 175. An example would be a service contract between A and B. If B repudiates after A has 
performed some part of the promised services, here, too, A will have a strong claim of 
misfeasance because she has suffered actual, present harm. 
 176. Lon Fuller argued that in cases like this, it is not the expectation interest but rather the 
restitution interest that “presents the strongest case for relief.” Fuller & Perdue, supra note 
173, at 56. Consider that the gravamen of the medieval writ of debt, an important precursor of 
the cause of action for breach of contract, was not that the defendant “had failed to do 
something which he had said he was going to do, but rather that he was detaining or 
withholding something to which the creditor was entitled. He was guilty of misfeasance, not 
nonfeasance.” A. W. B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE 
OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 80 (1975); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the 
Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s“Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
94, 141 (2000) (“Debt, according to Holmes, had its origin not in . . . exchange of promises, 
but in an action to recover a sum certain that the medieval jurists thought of as property of the 
plaintiff wrongly withheld by the defendant.”).  
 177. See GILMORE, supra note 66, at 95–97.  
 178. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402–04 (1967). 
 179. By contrast, if one party withdrew from arbitration after proceedings had been 
initiated but before the award, there would be a stronger tort-based argument to enforce the 
agreement because the nonbreaching party would have detrimentally relied. 
Here it could be retorted that, separability doctrine notwithstanding, performance of the 
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Another reason is that the remedy enshrined in section 2 of the FAA for breaching 
arbitration agreements is not restitution, reliance, or even expectation damages; it is 
nothing less than mandatory specific performance. But specific performance is the 
remedy par excellence for vindicating the promissory interest—that is, the interest in 
realizing future benefits.180 It therefore goes far beyond compensating for any 
interference with negative liberty, which has been the standard critique of awarding 
expectation damages or specific performance in lieu of reliance or restitution.181 
Given this, it is difficult to see how autonomy qua negative liberty can possibly 
supply a reason in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements. As many theorists have 
already observed, it is just as consistent with letting the parties alone, both in the 
sense of (i) giving the breaching party the freedom to change her mind and (ii) 
withholding assistance to the nonbreaching party in realizing the benefit of her 
bargain or her expectation interests.182  
Here it could be objected that enforcement is not coercive to the breaching party 
because she had no right to breach in the first place. Any liberal society must 
                                                                                                                 
 
container contract is surely relevant insofar as it might suggest that the seller or service 
provider conferred a benefit or relied to its detriment when the product or service was 
originally provided and paid for. Because arbitration tends to lower costs, the argument goes, 
rational sellers or service providers will pass those cost savings on to purchasers in the form 
of lower prices. If the purchaser then breaks her promise to arbitrate, it would be unjust for her 
to retain the benefit of the lower priced product or service, which also represents the measure 
of the seller or service provider’s detrimental reliance. This is in the nature of a negative 
liberty, rights-based retort. 
But the argument that sellers and service providers pass on the cost savings from arbitration 
to their customers has rarely been used to support enforcement on rights-based grounds; 
instead, it has been used principally to support enforcement on efficiency grounds. The idea 
is that everyone is better off (i.e., saves money) with arbitration clauses—including the 
consumer who may choose otherwise. See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive 
Arbitration Agreements—with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration 
Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 255–56 (2006); cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 
585, 593–94 (1991) (making similar argument with respect to forum-selection clauses). 
Likewise, the Court has rarely (if at all) invoked reliance or unjust enrichment to justify 
enforcement, preferring instead to focus on the bare fact of an agreement or promise. For 
example, it rationalized FAA preemption in part on the theory that the FAA “‘assure[s] those 
who desired arbitration . . . that their expectations would not be undermined.’” Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (emphasis added) (quoting Metro Indus. Painting 
Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring)). 
Likewise, in undoing the nonarbitrability line of cases beginning with Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 
427 (1953), it frequently warned that, “‘having made the bargain to arbitrate,’ [parties would] 
be held to their bargain.” Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987); 
accord Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
 180. As Seana Shiffrin argued in a related vein, if the purpose of contract law were to 
enforce promises, specific performance rather than expectation damages would be the standard 
remedy for breach. For morality requires that promisors keep their promises rather than pay 
them off. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 708, 722–23 (2007).  
 181. See, e.g., supra note 173. 
 182. Pettit, supra note 62, at 286–90; Todd D. Rakoff, Is “Freedom From Contract” 
Necessarily a Libertarian Freedom?, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 477, 481–82. 
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recognize rule-of-law constraints on freedom. When a trespasser pitches a tent on 
property owned by another, we think of the owner’s negative liberty as having been 
infringed. Forcing the trespasser to leave or pay rent merely deters or compensates 
for that infringement and is not in any meaningful sense an infringement of the 
trespasser’s freedom. And if so, the objection goes, why shouldn’t it be the same in 
the case of enforcing an arbitration agreement against a breaching party? I have two 
responses. 
First, the objection loses some force in the arbitration context. The reason is that 
courts have invoked the autonomy thesis to support enforcement even where one 
party had the right to breach and was therefore arguably without blame for resisting 
arbitration. For instance, under the aegis of FAA preemption, countless parties have 
been compelled to arbitrate pursuant to agreements that were either void or 
unenforceable under state law.183 An important policy rationale for these 
developments has nevertheless been the idea that enforcement furthers “consent, not 
coercion,”184 the “wishes of the contracting parties,”185 and their “discretion in 
designing arbitration processes . . . tailored to the type of dispute.”186 But for the 
reasons explained above, it is difficult to see how this is the case where one party no 
longer consents to or desires arbitration and was fully within her rights under state 
law to go back on her agreement.  
Second, even if the party resisting arbitration had no right to breach, it does not 
somehow neutralize the unfreedom she experiences when the agreement is enforced 
against her. This “neutralization” argument is a favorite of some libertarians, like 
Robert Nozick, who view the law as merely rendering us unable to do things (for 
example, commit trespass or breach of contract) rather than unfree to do them.187 But 
as G. A. Cohen has argued, this is questionable as a factual matter since we consider 
even properly convicted murderers to be unfree when they are imprisoned.188 The 
real point seems to be that enforcement renders the breaching party unfree but that 
her unfreedom is deemed normatively irrelevant because she has broken the law. But 
the trouble is that normative judgments are not value neutral; in this case, the 
judgment presupposes a baseline of legal entitlements that are themselves predicated 
                                                                                                                 
 
 183. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (enforcing 
arbitration agreement even though void because unconscionable or contrary to public policy); 
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. 1 (enforcing arbitration agreement even though void by statute). 
Justice Thomas would extend this to arbitration agreements that are unenforceable due to 
post-formation defects such as frustration of purpose or the statute of frauds because he 
assumes (paradoxically) that enforcement despite the defects would further the “consent of the 
parties.” Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1755 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 184. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
479 (1989). 
 185. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995) (enforcing 
award of punitive damages prohibited by state decisional law). 
 186. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749. 
 187. NOZICK, supra note 40, at 262 (“Other people’s actions place limits on one’s available 
opportunities. Whether this makes one’s resulting action non-voluntary [i.e., free] depends 
upon whether these others had the right to act as they did.”); see also HAYEK, supra note 32, 
at 153 (“[W]hen we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid down irrespective of 
their application to us, we are not subject to another man’s will and are therefore free.”). 
 188. COHEN, supra note 143, at 60. 
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on assumptions about the significance or worth of certain activities such as failing to 
keep promises or occupying land belonging to another.189 Enforcement reflects and 
reinforces those normative judgments. It cannot therefore retreat into value neutrality 
by claiming to honor the freedom of both parties. For in reality, it sacrifices the 
freedom of one in order to vindicate the other’s. As Morris Cohen observed almost 
a century ago,  
in enforcing contracts, the government does not merely allow two 
individuals to do what they have found pleasant in their eyes. 
Enforcement, in fact, puts the machinery of the law in the service of one 
party against the other. When that is worthwhile and how that should be 
done are important questions of public policy. . . . [T]he notion that in 
enforcing contracts the state is only giving effect to the will of the parties 
rests upon an utterly untenable theory as to what the enforcement of 
contracts involves.190  
The upshot is that the breaching party’s freedom claims can be bracketed only by 
relinquishing negative liberty’s aspiration to value neutrality. Otherwise put, a true 
value-neutral stance must recognize that the breaching party’s freedom claim is no 
less relevant than that of the nonbreaching party. But if so, as I have been arguing, it 
is difficult to explain why enforcing a contract against the breaching party is 
nonetheless consistent with promoting her negative liberty.  
B. Positive Liberty and the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements 
Does interpreting the autonomy thesis as a claim about positive liberty help 
explain why arbitration agreements should be both minimally regulated and enforced 
over the objection of the breaching party? Perhaps better than a negative liberty 
interpretation, but not by much.191  
In Part II.B.1, I argue that state regulation making arbitration agreements 
unenforceable can cut both in favor of and against positive liberty. On the one hand, 
if enforcing an arbitration agreement enables parties to accomplish things they could 
                                                                                                                 
 
 189. Id. at 56, 59–60; Hale, supra note 143, at 470–74. 
 190. Cohen, supra note 46, at 562 (emphasis added). Writing less than a decade after the 
FAA’s passage, Philip Phillips similarly noted the irony of a system of “voluntary” arbitration 
that depended on judicial enforcement. See Philip G. Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law: 
Compulsion as Applied to a Voluntary Proceeding, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1258, 1265–67 (1933). 
 191. Many scholars have likewise viewed contract enforcement as more consistent with 
positive rather than negative liberty. See DURKHEIM, supra note 172, at 216 (referring to the 
“eminently positive nature” of contract enforcement); Pettit, supra note 62, at 285–86 (arguing 
that contract enforcement is more readily explainable on positive rather than negative liberty 
grounds); Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 937 (1982) 
(reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)) (noting that “[i]t follows from 
the harm principle that enforcing voluntary obligations is not itself a proper goal for contract 
law,” yet defending enforcement on positive liberty grounds); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in 
Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1992) (explaining private property and contract rights in positive 
liberty terms). 
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not without the assistance or cooperation of the courts, enforcement would appear to 
promote the exercise of freedom and withholding enforcement would appear to 
compromise it. On the other hand, if what the parties seek to accomplish through 
their agreements is unlikely to result in any real or actual freedom, little will be lost 
by refusing to enforce those agreements. For example, to what extent does it improve 
positive freedom in arbitration to enforce agreements that call for the arbitrators to 
decide a case by consulting the “entrails of a dead fowl”? The answer to this question 
will likely depend on what we think freedom means in the arbitration context, which 
in turn will presuppose certain value judgments.  
In Part II.B.2, I argue that positive liberty provides a more plausible argument for 
why enforcing an arbitration agreement against an unwilling party arguably promotes 
her autonomy. The problem is that the conditions under which enforcement can be 
understood as improving positive liberty often do not obtain in the case of arbitration 
agreements. Yet arbitration law insists on enforcement regardless of whether those 
conditions exist. The same point has been made about the law’s enforcement of 
boilerplate clauses more generally.192 The upshot is that, to the extent we embrace a 
positive liberty interpretation of the autonomy thesis, we may be forced to 
acknowledge a variety of contexts in which arbitration agreements should not be 
enforced at all.  
1. Regulating Enforcement Does Not Necessarily Compromise Positive Liberty 
The crux of the problem in Part II.A.1 was that, even assuming that both parties 
remain in agreement at T2 (as the parties in Hall Street did in the trial court), it is 
difficult to see how regulating arbitration agreements interferes with the parties’ 
negative liberty. For by refusing to enforce a particular arbitration agreement, the 
state is not preventing or prohibiting parties from arbitrating on their own accord, as 
they did within medieval guilds and still do within certain trade associations and 
religious communities.193 Instead, it simply imposes conditions on the power to 
invoke the machinery of enforcement when one party no longer wishes to be bound.  
Construing the autonomy thesis as a claim about positive liberty presents a way out 
of some of these problems. Assuming the unlikely scenario in which both parties 
remain in agreement at T2—an assumption I shall indulge throughout Part II.B.1—state 
assistance through enforcement can certainly promote the exercise of freedom. In Hall 
Street, for example, enforcement enabled the parties to commandeer the resources of 
a reviewing court through private agreement.194 In other cases, it helps the parties 
                                                                                                                 
 
 192. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 88, at 82–98. 
 193. Arbitration without recourse to courts of law has historically been possible where 
there exists an effective means of enforcing agreements and awards extra-judicially—for 
example, on the strength of professional or community norms. See, e.g., CLARENCE F. 
BIRDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 
OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF ARBITRATION AND THEIR RELATIONS TO BUSINESS ETHICS, at vii 
(1926) (referring to “self-governing bodies . . . such as guilds, exchanges, boards of trade or 
trade associations,” which created their own arbitration rules and enforced arbitration awards 
internally); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 969–73 (1999). 
 194. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text.  
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realize the fruits of their agreement by providing for judicial assistance when they 
cannot agree on the selection of arbitrators195 or when there is a need to stay related 
litigation.196 Ironically, therefore, it is much easier to see how state regulation of 
enforcement compromises autonomy if autonomy is understood as a form of positive, 
rather than negative, liberty.  
But once we shift gears and think of autonomy as the ability to do things rather 
the mere absence of external constraints, the question of what things it makes sense 
to say that we are (or should be) free to do becomes salient. We typically think of 
being free to do only those things that have some plausible value. As Stanley Benn 
and William Weinstein have argued, it seems something of an oxymoron to say 
that one is free to do something completely valueless such as cutting off one’s 
ears.197 “[T]o see the point of saying that one is (or is not) free to do X,” they 
explain, “we must be able to see that there might be some point in doing it. Our 
conception of freedom is bounded by our notions of what might be worthwhile 
doing; it is out of its element when we find its objects bizarre.”198 Joseph Raz 
reaches the same conclusion from the standpoint of his much thicker account of 
positive liberty. In his view, it does not make sense to speak of autonomy in relation 
to valueless activities such as murder.199 And in a related vein John Gray argues 
that it is impossible to regard the proverbial “contented slave” as free no matter 
how unconstrained she might have been when choosing slavery or how fulfilled 
she now finds herself as a slave. For “judgments about freedom always invoke 
judgments about the preferences of the standard rational chooser, and . . . there is 
something at least problematic about counting as a freedom an opportunity to act 
which no reasonable man would ever take.”200  
If positive liberty cannot escape questions about purpose, value, or 
reasonableness, then the extent to which enforcement furthers autonomy qua positive 
liberty—and thus the extent to which restricting enforcement limits autonomy—will 
depend critically on how those questions are answered. Consider the extreme case of 
an arbitration agreement that provides for disputes to be adjudicated by a “panel of 
three monkeys”201 or by “studying the entrails of a dead fowl.”202 Here it is difficult 
to appreciate any good reason why parties would make such choices, let alone care 
                                                                                                                 
 
 195. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012). 
 196. Id. § 3.  
 197. S. I. Benn & W. L. Weinstein explain this as follows: “[C]utting off one’s ears is not 
the sort of thing anyone, in a standard range of conditions, would reasonably do . . . (even 
though some people have, in fact, done it).” S. I. Benn & W. L. Weinstein, Being Free to Act, 
and Being a Free Man, 80 MIND 194, 195 (1971). 
 198. Id.  
 199. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 380–81 (1986). Thus, although we might 
consider one who writes a stern letter to the editor after careful reflection to be more 
autonomous than one who does so in an unthinking rage, the same would not be true if the act 
in question had been the commission of a brutal murder. Calculating and instrumentally 
rational to be sure, but not autonomous. 
 200. GRAY, supra note 50, at 58. 
 201. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.). 
 202. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, 
J., concurring), overruled by Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).  
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about their enforcement. The point is not just that in such cases the freedom to choose 
one’s arbitration process is outweighed by a more compelling concern for 
arbitration’s public or institutional integrity.203 Rather, the point is that from a 
positive liberty standpoint it is hard to appreciate how this is a freedom at all.204 
Arbitrating before a panel of three monkeys, for instance, forecloses a host of moves 
that we care about in adjudicative processes, such as the ability to present evidence 
and reasoned arguments with confidence that a neutral decision maker will hear and 
consider them. Much like cutting off one’s ears, it is difficult to see how such a 
process contributes to anyone’s actual freedom and thus why the autonomy thesis, 
construed as a claim about positive liberty, would favor enforcement.  
Here it may be retorted that, as between a jurisdiction that does not enforce bizarre 
arbitration procedures and one that does, there are more opportunities available (and 
thus more freedom) in the latter.205 The problem with this retort is that the sheer 
number of choices, while important, cannot be the exclusive measure of positive 
freedom. Consider two further jurisdictions: in the first, courts will enforce any 
choice of a decision maker so long as they are human; agreements calling for a panel 
of three monkeys or a jury of twelve orangutans206 are unenforceable. In the second, 
courts will enforce the choice of any primate to be a decision maker except those 
who self-identify as Mormon. In terms of quantity, there are vastly more choices 
available in the second jurisdiction—namely, the entire primate kingdom minus just 
15 million humans.207 But that does not necessarily translate into more positive 
freedom. There is arguably less real freedom in the second jurisdiction if it means 
that parties will be deterred from appointing competent, desirable arbitrators of their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 203. This is the typical rationale offered by commentators for why such agreements are, or 
should be, unenforceable. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA To Permit 
Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214, 233 n.76 (2007) (arguing 
that “freedom of contract must yield in those cases where the integrity of the courts as an 
institution is threatened”); cf. Richard Lorren Jolly, Between the Ceiling and the Floor: 
Making the Case for Required Disclosure of High-Low Agreements to Juries, 48 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 813, 817–21 (2015) (arguing that the parties’ autonomy to select unconventional 
litigation procedures should be limited by public policy considerations). 
 204. Taylor has defended this point in a related example. See supra note 60 and 
accompanying text.  
 205. This might be a plausible argument if the state prohibited parties from arbitrating in 
front of a panel of three monkeys, such as by imposing criminal penalties on such proceedings. 
But as explained in Part II.A.1, when the state merely withholds the power of enforcement, it 
does not in any meaningful sense place restrictions on negative liberty. The parties remain free 
to arbitrate their disputes in any way they wish, so long as they do not require the court’s 
assistance through enforcement.  
 206. United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[I]f the parties stipulated 
to trial by 12 orangutans the defendant’s conviction would be invalid notwithstanding his 
consent, because some minimum of civilized procedure is required by community feeling 
regardless of what the defendant wants or is willing to accept.”). 
 207. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints estimates its current worldwide 
membership at 15,372,337 individuals. See Facts and Statistics, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS: NEWSROOM, http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/facts-and-statistics 
[https://perma.cc/8SW2-CF36] (last updated 2016). 
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own choosing who happen to subscribe to a particular faith.208 The upshot is that the 
nature of our choices is at least as important as their quantity in our assessments 
about freedom in the positive sense. Positive liberty claims register only against “a 
background understanding, too obvious to spell out, of some activities and goals as 
highly significant for human beings and others as less so.”209  
A harder case has to do with agreements to modify the limited grounds for vacatur 
of arbitral awards in FAA section 10. Prior to Hall Street, the circuit courts had split 
sharply on this issue. Some courts enforced such agreements on freedom-based 
considerations210 while others refused to do so, reasoning that customization would 
confer on private parties a rather extravagant power to dictate how federal courts 
should review arbitral awards—a power that, among other things, could significantly 
change the workload of courts and threaten other institutional values.211 Although 
the Court endorsed the latter view on narrow statutory-interpretation grounds,212 the 
ensuing debate among commentators refocused the issues on the relationship 
between the autonomy thesis and enforcement.  
Most scholars argued that by refusing to enforce the agreement in Hall Street, the 
Court was ipso facto retreating from the autonomy thesis.213 Ware, for instance, 
declared Hall Street “an affront to party autonomy, the core policy of arbitration law. 
Who is in a position to tell the parties that they are better off with litigation than with 
arbitration followed by judicial review? Let them decide that for themselves.”214 
These arguments assume that the state reduces freedom when it fails to promote a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 208. Critics of so-called mandatory binding arbitration can be understood as making a 
similar argument. The thrust of their objection is that consumers and employees are not in any 
meaningful sense “free” in an arbitration proceeding because of the many process deficiencies 
of arbitration. The implication is that they are actually freer in a judicial proceeding governed 
by mandatory rules—that is, a proceeding in which fewer process choices are available. Here, 
too, the sheer number of opportunities is not the measure of freedom; instead, assessments 
about freedom turn on judgments about the comparative worth or value of arbitration as 
against litigation.  
 209. TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 218. 
 210. See Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995), 
abrogated by Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 211. See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs. Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 540 U.S. 1098 (2004); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 
254 F.3d 925, 934–37 (10th Cir. 2001); see also UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 
148 F.3d 992, 997–98 (8th Cir. 1998) (dictum); LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 
F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring), overruled by Kyocera, 341 F.3d 987. 
 212. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 585–89 (2008). Whether or not the opinion was correct or 
desirable is a matter on which I take no position here. My claim is simply that the decision is 
not obviously inconsistent with the autonomy thesis if “autonomy” is construed as a type of 
positive liberty.  
 213. See Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN. 
ST. L. REV. 1103, 1128–33 (2009); Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and 
Prospects for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929, 932 (2010) 
(describing the view of most commentators that Hall Street “seemed to contravene the 
principles of party autonomy and contractual freedom”). 
 214. Stephen J. Ware, “Opt-In” for Judicial Review of Errors of Law Under the Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 263, 271–72 (1997). 
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particular opportunity (such as judicial review of arbitral agreements) regardless of 
the opportunity’s value or worth.  
The trouble is that positive liberty does not work like negative liberty. If freedom 
is conceived as the sheer absence of external restraints, then it is readily apparent 
how fewer restrictions on choice implies greater negative liberty almost by 
definition.215 But the argument is far less straightforward if the issue has less to do 
with what choices the state prohibits and more to do with what choices the state fails 
to promote. In this context, it is much harder to retreat into value neutrality by simply 
counting the number of foreclosed opportunities. Doing so makes it impossible to 
distinguish, for example, between a regime in which only agreements for vacatur 
based on legal error are unenforceable and one in which only agreements to submit 
disputes to a panel of three monkeys are unenforceable. If there are no distinctions 
of value to be made, regimes that each fail to support one type of agreement leave us 
equally unfree in the positive sense. Yet most commentators who consider Hall 
Street to be inconsistent with the autonomy thesis would likely perceive the second 
regime to provide far more real freedom than the first.216  
From a positive liberty standpoint, therefore, Hall Street’s refusal to honor the 
parties’ agreement for judicial review of an arbitrator’s legal errors would not 
necessarily be in tension with the autonomy thesis if such agreements were valueless 
in the sense that they were not “possible object[s] of reasonable choice.”217 For if so, 
they are unlikely to contribute to real freedom in the arbitration process. This is not 
an entirely unfamiliar argument. Thomas Carbonneau defends something like this 
view when he argues that parties who contract for judicial review of arbitral awards 
are “mistaken in their choice of arbitration.”218 On Carbonneau’s view, such contracts 
“thwart the arbitral process by cluttering it with uselessly intricate provisions for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 215. See supra note 205.  
 216. Ware might respond that he is not denying the possibility of making distinctions of 
value in the abstract; rather, his claim is that it is not the place of the state to force those value 
judgments on the parties. This appears to be the thrust of Alan Rau’s assessment of Hall Street 
as “extraordinarily officious” because it “impos[ed] the putative ‘benefits’ of finality and 
economy on parties” against their will. Rau, supra note 78, at 490. It is also implied in Justice 
Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Hall Street. Stevens argued that the parties’ agreement should 
be enforced because doing so represents a hands-off approach—what he referred to as “[a] 
decision ‘not to regulate.’” Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). The implication is that by refusing to give effect to the parties’ voluntary choices, 
the state is actively interfering with their “freedom.”  
But as we saw in Part II.A.1, when the state makes arbitration agreements unenforceable 
(unlike when it makes arbitration illegal), it does not “force” or “impose” anything on the 
parties; it just withholds the benefit of the state’s enforcement machinery, thereby “leav[ing] 
both parties as it finds them.” See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 
1907 (2011). The decision to withhold those benefits is based on public values and policies to 
be sure, but that is not the same as saying that the values are being “imposed” on private 
parties. 
 217. Benn & Weinstein, supra note 197, at 195. 
 218. Carbonneau, Crossroads, supra note 1, at 258 (emphasis added); see also Thomas E. 
Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates, 
14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 593, 613 (2012) (suggesting that this type of choice is 
“ill-considered” and not “responsibl[e]”). 
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arbitration”219 and by subjecting it to increased oversight and scrutiny by courts of 
law.220 Enforcing them may enable certain choices, but over time it is also likely to 
frustrate many others that users of arbitration care deeply about: speed, economy, 
and avoiding “full-bore” judicial proceedings, to name a few.221 At the end of the 
day, the argument goes, we will find ourselves stuck in a less functional and effective 
process—and in this sense less free. Thus, rather than see Hall Street as in tension 
with the autonomy thesis, Carbonneau reconciles the two by drawing the following 
lesson: “parties can choose freely as long as their choices do not lead to an 
oxymoronic or pathological reference to arbitration.”222 The upshot is not so much 
that party autonomy should be subordinated to extra-contractual values such as the 
institutional integrity of the courts,223 but that certain choices are themselves so 
“pathological” or “oxymoronic” that they do not contribute in any meaningful sense 
to the actual exercise of freedom. And if so, the autonomy thesis, understood as a 
claim about positive liberty, would not seem to require encouraging those choices by 
enforcing them.  
Stipanowich makes a similar argument. He believes that agreements such as the 
one at issue in Hall Street sometimes reflect “wrong” or “questionable” choices, 
either because they end up compromising important process values such as finality 
or because they suggest a lack of serious, second-order reflection that characterizes 
autonomy in the thick positive sense.224 He argues that the fundamental question 
raised by these provisions is whether they are of any real benefit to end users. He 
reports that leading arbitration attorneys and arbitrators recently answered this 
question “with a resounding ‘No!’”225 The explanation, again, returns us to questions 
of value: the respondents “viewed such provisions as undermining key conventional 
benefits of arbitration, including finality, efficiency, economy, and expert decision 
making.”226 
For those like Stipanowich and Carbonneau who interpret autonomy in positive 
more so than negative terms, autonomy might not necessarily require the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements strictly “according to their terms.”227 For some 
agreements, if enforced to the letter, will not in any meaningful sense improve our 
actual freedom in arbitration; indeed, they may make us less free. This seems 
straightforwardly true for marginal cases such as agreements to arbitrate before a 
panel of three monkeys or by consulting the entrails of a dead fowl. I take no position 
on whether this is also true in the case of agreements like the one in Hall Street other 
than to note that reasonable minds such as Ware, Stipanowich, and Carbonneau have 
actually differed on the issue. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 219. Carbonneau, Contract Freedom, supra note 1, at 1231. 
 220. Carbonneau, supra note 218, at 614.  
 221. See Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 588. 
 222. Carbonneau, supra note 218, at 613. 
 223. But see id. at 594 (describing the “restraints placed upon contract freedom” by 
Hall Street). 
 224. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 425–26 (citing the CPR Commission on the Future 
of Arbitration); id. at 436. 
 225. Id. at 426. 
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 227. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013). 
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In sum, as between positive and negative liberty interpretations of the autonomy 
thesis, the former presents a much more plausible argument against regulating the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements. But as we saw in this section, positive 
liberty can sometimes be consistent with such regulation because it cannot be 
divorced from questions of value. We will disagree about these values to be sure; the 
important point is just that our assessments about what type of regulation is (or is 
not) consistent with the autonomy thesis cannot pretend to be value neutral.228 
2. Enforcement Can Promote the Positive Liberty of the Party Who No Longer 
Wishes To Arbitrate 
Of course, even in a case like Hall Street one party almost certainly resists 
enforcement. How, then, does positive liberty help overcome the problem in Part 
II.A.2—the problem of how forcing a party to arbitrate against her wishes can 
nonetheless be said to further her positive liberty?  
One answer is to concede that enforcement diminishes the freedom of the 
breaching party but to argue that this diminution is outweighed by the greater 
freedom made available to others by strengthening the institution of enforcement. I 
shall defer a consideration of this argument to Part III.  
Another answer is to entertain a much thicker conception of positive liberty, not so 
much as the ability to exercise free choice but as a capacity for self-legislation—what 
many philosophers would say is the only true autonomy. Autonomy in this sense is 
not coterminous with the idea of freedom and can sometimes imply just the 
opposite.229 Dworkin makes this point with an example from Homer’s Odyssey:  
Not wanting to be lured onto the rocks by the sirens, [Odysseus] 
commands his men to tie him to the mast and refuse all later orders he 
will give to be set free. He wants to have his freedom limited so that he 
can survive. . . . He has a preference about his [future] preferences, a 
desire not to have or to act upon various desires. He views the desire to 
move his ship closer to the sirens as something that is no part of him, but 
alien to him. In limiting his liberty, in accordance with his wishes, we 
promote, not hinder, his efforts to define the contours of his life.230 
Consider that if Odysseus had not been tied down, he would have been free at T2 to 
steer (or not to steer) toward the island of the Sirens. But if he had actually done so 
under the influence of the Sirens’ song, we would not think of him as having acted 
autonomously. Odysseus’s autonomy consists instead in the fact that he recognizes 
that his own first-order choice at T2 is liable to be misguided, regrettable, or 
otherwise compromised.231 Rather than sit by passively, he has made a second-order 
                                                                                                                 
 
 228. See TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 218. 
 229. See, e.g., id. at 222 (“[T]he fact that I am doing what I want, in the sense of following 
my strongest desire, is not sufficient to establish that I am [autonomous].”). 
 230. DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 14–15 (emphasis added). 
 231. The trouble with a negative liberty or even a thin positive liberty justification for 
enforcement is that each fails to distinguish between first- and second-order choices. They are 
therefore disabled from making distinctions about the quality of the agent’s decision making 
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choice at T1 to be self-directing—to take his fate into his own hands. The fact that 
this involves restricting rather than expanding his freedom at T2 does not make him 
less autonomous; if anything, it makes him more so.  
In order for this argument to work, we must feel confident that the quality of the 
agent’s second-order choice at T1 is somehow superior to her first-order choice at T2 
in the sense that it was both more independent and rational.232 If Odysseus had 
instructed his men to tie him to the mast at T1 out of an uncritical deference to a 
trusted advisor, we might think he made the right decision but we would not think of 
him as having acted independently.233 By the same token, if Odysseus had chosen to 
reject the regimen of his military training in favor of a more spontaneous, “come 
what may” attitude toward life and as a result instructed his men not to restrain him 
despite the evident risks, we might think of him as enjoying a certain carefree 
independence but we would not consider him to have acted rationally (particularly if 
he ended up being lulled to his death). In this case, we would not consider Odysseus 
more autonomous for sticking to his decision at T1 to be unrestrained; to the contrary, 
we would consider him more autonomous if, just before coming within earshot of 
the Sirens at T2, he realizes he has made a terrible mistake and commands his men to 
strap him.  
Now consider someone who enters into a binding predispute arbitration 
agreement. We can understand this as a type of self-legislation at T1 if the agent acts 
(i) independently, insofar as she makes up her own mind to opt out of the litigation 
default rather than doing so out of laziness, peer pressure, or other internal weakness 
of will, and (ii) rationally, insofar as she can articulate plausible reasons for doing 
so, such as anticipated efficiency gains, the ability to select expert decision makers, 
or quite simply that she is being offered a lower price in exchange for her promise to 
arbitrate.234 Only then might holding the agent to this act of self-legislation promote 
                                                                                                                 
 
at T1 and T2. As a result, enforcement can be explained on freedom grounds only by assuming 
away the existence of a contrary choice at T2 or by conceding its existence but treating it as 
normatively irrelevant. By introducing the concept of a second-order choice, it is no longer 
necessary to elide the coercive nature of contract enforcement. Indeed, the agent’s considered 
choice to subject herself to that coercion at T2 is precisely what makes her decision at T1 
autonomous. It reflects a recognition that she might be under a strong temptation to act out of 
shortsighted motives and breach the contract at T2, but that in the long run she would be better 
off upholding it. 
 232. O’Neill, supra note 53, at 203–05 (defending a conception of autonomy that combines 
notions of coherence and independence of the will); see also BENN, supra note 52, at 176; 
DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 18 (distinguishing between acting from one’s “reflective and 
critical faculties” and acting under “subliminal” or other “ad hoc” influences); GRAY, supra 
note 50, at 57–59 (“[N]o viable conception of liberty can altogether dispense with 
considerations deriving from the difficult idea of the real or rational will.”). 
 233. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 16 (arguing that autonomy consists (in part) in 
being able to “scrutinize critically [one’s] first-order motivations”); see also BENN, supra note 
52, at 177 (arguing that the autonomous person does not make choices based on “beliefs he 
has simply introjected uncritically and unexamined from his social milieu”). 
 234. Of course, this is a slippery slope. As Berlin warned, once we are in a position to 
interrogate the plausibility of the agent’s reasons, we are in a position to tell the agent that 
some of her reasons are mistaken or just plain wrong. To some positive liberty theorists, 
however, making such judgments is intimately bound up with assessments of autonomy. 
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her autonomy even when she develops a strong first-order preference at T2 to litigate. 
Part of the reason why is that we believe her preference to avoid the agreement at T2 
is likely to be short-sighted, less reflective, and in this way less autonomous than the 
second-order choice she takes at T1 to pre-commit to forego that preference.235 But 
if her choice to avoid the agreement at T2 were somehow more independent and 
rational than her decision to enter it at T1, either because it was taken with better or 
more complete information, or because the reasons against submitting the dispute to 
arbitration are vastly more compelling than the reasons in favor of it, then it becomes 
a serious question whether the autonomy thesis still requires enforcement.236  
The trouble is that in the context of adhesion contracts, at least, it is difficult to 
describe the decision that most consumers and employees take at T1 as an act of 
self-legislation. The point is not the familiar one that such parties are not truly free 
to choose (and thus do not meaningfully consent) when terms are presented to them 
on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.237 The futility of consent is principally a claim about 
                                                                                                                 
 
TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 226–28 (arguing that the agent cannot be the final arbiter of whether 
he or she is free).  
Gray suggests something of a middle path, which is to say that the agent should be able to 
articulate “a reason” for her choice—a requirement intended to “disqualif[y] as rational 
conduct . . . only the behaviour of a delirious agent, where no goal or end may be imputed to 
[her] which renders intelligible what [s]he does.” GRAY, supra note 50, at 59. On this account, 
we would not consider someone who chooses to arbitrate an important commercial dispute in 
front of a panel of three monkeys to be acting autonomously, in part because we doubt that an 
adjudicative process so devoid of value could be a possible object of reasonable choice. For 
what reasons would such a person offer to explain her choice? What intelligible goals or 
purposes would the choice further?  
 235. For example, if she turns out to be the defendant in a subsequent dispute, she may 
prefer to litigate if she could more effectively drag out the proceedings through plenary 
discovery and motion practice under the rules of judicial procedure. Likewise, if she turns out 
to be the plaintiff, she may prefer to plead her case to a jury.  
Early twentieth century supporters of the FAA made a similar point in their assault on the 
common-law revocability doctrine. The problem with revocability, they argued, was that it 
enabled the short-sighted interests of litigants and their lawyers, who sought to escape 
predispute arbitration agreements for opportunistic reasons more so than because of an 
improvident or otherwise compromised choice at T1. See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 23, at 
1997–99. 
 236. To be sure, enforcement might nonetheless be justified on fairness or morality 
grounds—for example, because the other party has relied to her detriment or conferred a 
benefit, or simply because a promise is a promise. From an autonomy standpoint, however, 
the reasons against enforcement would appear to outweigh those in favor of it. 
 237. This critique, of course, has a long pedigree. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of 
Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943); 
Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970); Edwin W. Patterson, The 
Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919) (arguing that “‘freedom 
of contract’ rarely exists” with respect to “contracts of ‘adhesion’”); Todd D. Rakoff, 
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983) 
(noting that in many situations, the propounder of the preprinted form contract does not expect 
that the adherent will read or understand it); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and 
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, Comment, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1976). 
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the ability to exercise free choice—that is, a claim about the lack of certain external 
resources such as time, financial ability, or other incidents of bargaining leverage.238 
Rather, the point is that such parties also typically lack internal prerequisites for 
making a second-order choice about their future choices, such as a full and complete 
understanding of the procedures to which they are committing themselves,239 an 
ability to discuss potential disputes candidly,240 or a motivation to plan for them in 
advance.241 In other words, they are often not “in a position to reflect upon [or] resist” 
arbitration clauses—capacities that John Christman takes to be a hallmark of 
autonomy in the thick positive sense.242  
These internal constraints, moreover, do not appear to be unique to the adhesion 
context. As Stipanowich reports, they are just as likely to afflict sophisticated parties 
with greater bargaining leverage, many of whom fail to invest independent, critical 
thought into selecting sensible dispute-resolution options and appear all too willing 
to delegate those decisions to others.243 And if so, it is difficult to appreciate how 
their autonomy is furthered by enforcing the choice they made at T1 over their revised 
and more proximate choice at T2. For the latter is more likely to have been made with 
greater information about the nature of the dispute, with greater attention paid to the 
scope of the arbitration agreement, or with advice from a lawyer.  
In short, interpreting the autonomy thesis as a claim about autonomy in the thick 
positive sense has the greatest potential to explain the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements against unwilling parties as a theoretical matter. But if, as a factual 
matter, many arbitration agreements (adhesive or otherwise) do not actually manifest 
the self-legislation characteristic of this type of autonomy, construing the autonomy 
thesis in this way likely militates against enforcement in a variety of circumstances.  
This, in turn, puts the autonomy thesis in tension with arbitration law—hardly 
surprising since the latter’s strong negative liberty orientation prevents it from 
distinguishing first-order from second-order choice.244 Consider again Doctor’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 238. Note this is a claim about the lack of positive rather than negative liberty. Critics of 
“take-it-or-leave-it” contracts do not, in the main, contend that such contracts amount to 
external coercion such as duress or even undue influence.  
 239. Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang Liu, “Whimsy Little 
Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer 
Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 45–48 (2015) (finding, inter alia, 
that only 14% of respondents shown an arbitration clause realized that it precluded them from 
suing in court). 
 240. See Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 390 (explaining that sophisticated parties often 
fail to make good predispute choices regarding arbitration, in part because they are “reluctant 
to dwell on the subject of relational conflict”). 
 241. See Sovern et al., supra note 239, at 24 (surveying existing empirical studies and 
concluding that the “[l]ength and density [of standard form contracts] deter consumers from 
attempting to read contract terms at all, and the terms are unintelligible for most people who 
attempt to read them”). 
 242. Christman, supra note 49, at 346. 
 243. See supra notes 100–14 and accompanying text. This may explain recent findings that 
procedural contracting is not as common as we are apt to believe. See generally David A. 
Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389; W. Mark C. Weidemaier, 
Customized Procedure in Theory and Reality, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865 (2015). 
 244. The same might also be said of contract law, which takes objective rather than 
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Associates v. Casarotto, which involved a Montana statute that made arbitration 
clauses unenforceable unless “‘[n]otice that [the] contract is subject to arbitration’” 
is “‘typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract.’”245 As many 
argued, the statute was consistent with (and even tended to promote) autonomy in 
the thick positive sense because it enforced only those arbitration agreements that 
were at least brought to the attention of the nondrafting party.246 Nonetheless, the 
Court held that it was preempted by the FAA.247  
The upshot is that if we justify enforcement in certain contexts as promoting 
self-legislation, we will have to part company with arbitration law in other contexts 
where enforcement—let alone rigorous enforcement—is arguably inconsistent with 
self-legislation. We will also need to recognize that proposed reforms such as the 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015 may not be so opposed to autonomy qua 
self-legislation and might even help promote it. The crux of the Act is not that 
arbitration is categorically inappropriate for consumers and employees; instead, it is 
that it is very difficult for them to make a considered, reflective judgment about binding 
arbitration—that is, to effectively self-legislate—before an actual dispute has arisen.  
III. THE “MAXIMUM NET AUTONOMY” ARGUMENT  
In this Part, I consider a final argument that is sometimes used to explain how 
contract enforcement furthers autonomy even while it restricts the freedom of the 
breaching party. It goes something like this: the greater freedom that is preserved for 
others to enter agreements with the confidence that they will be enforced outweighs 
any unfreedom that inures to breaching parties in particular cases. I refer to this as 
the “maximum net autonomy” argument.  
The argument is not without its supporters. Charles Fried, for instance, describes 
contract enforcement as beneficial insofar as it produces a net increase in the freedom 
of all to continue making contracts.248 Smith suggests that restricting the breaching 
party’s freedom is justified because it “generally increases our options” and 
“permit[s] us to do things we could not do otherwise”—that is, it produces greater 
net freedom overall.249 The claim has also been made in the arbitration context. For 
example, Ware has argued that “[t]he interests of consumers as a group are better 
                                                                                                                 
 
subjective consent as sufficient to bind the promisor even as to boilerplate terms. See RADIN, 
supra note 88, at 89–90. The difference is that the rigorous enforcement of arbitration 
agreements means that any state legislative efforts designed to improve the quality of assent 
to such agreements are prohibited, whereas contract law readily cedes ground to such efforts 
in specific adhesive contexts. 
 245. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (alteration in original) 
(quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)). 
 246. E.g., Moses, supra note 71, at 542. 
 247. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687. The decision has been construed as preventing states from 
requiring a minimum level of informed consent to arbitration agreements.  
 248. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 7–17 (1981). 
 249. SMITH, supra note 66, at 258; see also Pettit, supra note 62, at 281–83 (arguing that 
both state regulation and enforcement of contracts, while decreasing the freedom of some, 
may increase the “sum total of freedom of exchange in society”). 
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served” by enforcing mandatory arbitration clauses because a system that facilitates 
trading the right to judicial resolution for lower prices will create more options for 
them generally.250 
The maximum net autonomy argument in many ways presents the strongest 
affirmative rationale for enforcing contracts in general, which is why it deserves 
some treatment here. But there are two basic problems with it in the arbitration 
context. First, the argument is directed first and foremost at promoting the institution 
of predispute arbitration agreements. It therefore cannot explain why any particular 
agreement, such as the one at issue in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion251 or in 
American Express v. Italian Colors,252 should be enforced. More importantly, it 
cannot explain why arbitration agreements are enforced more strictly than contracts 
generally. For example, it cannot explain why arbitration agreements should be 
enforced even when they are contrary to state legislation or public policy.253 The 
reason is that the institution itself can thrive even while a whole host of individual 
arbitration agreements are denied enforcement, just like the insurance industry 
thrives even though insurance contracts are one of the most heavily regulated of their 
kind. Indeed, refusing to enforce particular arbitration agreements, such as 
agreements to arbitrate before a panel of three monkeys, might actually strengthen 
the institution’s legitimacy.  
Second, because it subordinates the autonomy of the contracting parties to 
autonomy conceived in much broader terms, it is not strictly speaking a freedom or 
autonomy argument at all. To understand how this is the case, it will be necessary to 
unpack the distinction between liberty and autonomy theories, on the one hand, and 
utilitarian or efficiency theories, on the other.  
An example of an efficiency theory is the idea that, because the individual is the 
best judge of her own welfare, voluntary transactions are almost certain to make at 
least one person better off and no person worse off (assuming no externalities).254 
Promoting such “Pareto superior” exchanges would therefore appear to promote 
welfare writ large. Another example is cost-benefit theories, which hold that overall 
welfare can be maximized even if some persons are made worse off so long as others 
are made better off to a greater degree. For example, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
expresses the idea that a given state of affairs is welfare enhancing if and only if the 
“winners gain sufficiently so that they could compensate the losers with a net gain in 
welfare,” even if no compensation actually takes place.255  
Enforcing a particular arbitration agreement against an unwilling party could be 
justified as Kaldor-Hicks efficient so long as the costs to that party were outweighed 
by its benefits to the other.256 The institution of enforcing arbitration agreements 
                                                                                                                 
 
 250. Ware, Consumer Arbitration, supra note 95, at 210–12.  
 251. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 252. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 253. This follows as a consequence of FAA preemption. See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 4, 
at 1271–72; Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 
1229–30 (2011). 
 254. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 7 (1997) 
(emphasizing that this is only a “presumption”). 
 255. JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 136 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 256. By contrast, it is difficult to see how enforcing a contract against an unwilling party 
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more generally could likewise be justified as long as the aggregate cost to parties 
who are compelled to arbitrate are outweighed by the aggregate benefits to society 
in the form of docket clearing, conservation of judicial resources, and savings in cost 
and time.  
The problem, however, is that efficiency arguments and autonomy arguments are 
very different animals. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency arguments, for instance, entail no 
special solicitude for private ordering because an arrangement can be Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient regardless of whether anyone has actually consented to it.257 If it could 
somehow be proved that using arbitration saves lending institutions and courts far 
more money than the cost to consumers of forfeiting a judicial forum,258 there would 
be a strong efficiency-based justification for categorically referring all consumer 
debt-collection cases to arbitration regardless of the consumer’s wishes.259 By the 
same token, parties have sometimes invoked cost-benefit considerations to argue 
against enforcing arbitration agreements that they had freely entered.260 For example, 
                                                                                                                 
 
is a reliable way to promote Pareto superior moves. Even if the promisor freely consented at 
T1, her “revealed” preference at T2 reflects an assessment that completing the transaction will 
leave her worse off. The Pareto standard therefore cannot explain why her antecedent choice 
is more relevant to the utilitarian calculus than her updated choice at the time of 
enforcement—a problem Michael Trebilcock has dubbed the “Paretian dilemma.” 
TREBILCOCK, supra note 254, at 244; see also Peter Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of 
Justification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 273, 284 (1995) (arguing that Pareto 
efficiency “cannot possibly provide a normative basis for contract”); Jay M. Feinman, Critical 
Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 841 (1983) (arguing that contract law 
favors the breaching party’s “prior exercise of autonomy in entering into the agreement over 
the present exercise of autonomy in disavowing it,” which “by definition decreases [her] 
welfare”); Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 742 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2004) 
(“Pareto efficiency itself cannot explain why the ex ante Pareto result that argues for enforcing 
the agreement should be privileged over the ex post Pareto result that argues against enforcing 
the agreement.” (italics omitted)).  
 257. See COLEMAN, supra note 255, at 134; TREBILCOCK, supra note 254, at 245–48.  
The same is not necessarily true of Pareto efficiency, which enjoys a certain synergy with 
autonomy theories. See COLEMAN, supra note 255, at 101–05; IAN SHAPIRO, THE MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICS 43–44 (2003) (arguing that “Pareto’s denial of the possibility of 
interpersonal comparisons had the effect of importing a powerful doctrine of individual 
autonomy into the core logic of utilitarianism” that “create[d] analytical and moral space for 
the Enlightenment ideal of individual rights”). For the reasons stated above, however, Pareto 
efficiency does not provide even a plausible efficiency justification for enforcing a contract 
over the present objection of one party. See supra note 256.  
 258. PETER B. RUTLEDGE, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ARBITRATION—A 
GOOD DEAL FOR CONSUMERS 13 (2008) (estimating that if predispute arbitration clauses could 
not be enforced in consumer debt-collection cases, a “deluge of new cases” would increase the 
docket of California small-claims courts by roughly 14%).  
 259. Of course, it is precisely because we value individual liberty that state-mandated 
arbitration schemes are rare, although not unknown. See Dwight Golann, Making Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 565–66 (1989). 
 260. But the autonomy thesis has meant that such efficiency-based arguments are almost 
always cast aside. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (enforcing arbitration clause despite defendant’s argument that doing 
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in Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, the plaintiff argued that the benefits of enforcement 
were outweighed by the delay and other inefficiencies that would likely result from 
having to litigate federal-law claims while arbitrating pendent state-law claims.261  
Cost-benefit arguments are sometimes made to look like autonomy arguments by 
substituting “autonomy” for “welfare.” This is the gist of the maximum net autonomy 
argument, which holds that any loss in the breaching party’s autonomy caused by 
enforcement is outweighed by the greater gain in autonomy that the rest of us enjoy 
by having a reliable institution of enforcement. But what passes for “autonomy” here 
is in truth something like utility, to be maximized across individuals even if it means 
sacrificing the autonomy of some for the greater autonomy of others. It is a slippery 
slope from the proposition that restricting the breaching party’s freedom creates even 
more freedom overall to the proposition that restricting freedom in other ways will 
result in a like increase. This is why the maximum net autonomy argument is not a 
bona fide autonomy argument. For it gives short shrift to ideas of voluntariness, 
separateness, and choice that, in one form or other, are central to both negative and 
positive conceptions of individual freedom.262  
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have questioned the extent to which the autonomy thesis provides 
a basis for insisting on the rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements—that is, 
for insisting that such agreements are not just enforced but enforced with minimal 
regulation by the state. If the thesis is construed as a claim about negative liberty, it 
is difficult to see how autonomy requires either enforcement or minimal regulation. 
If, following some scholars, it is construed as a claim about positive liberty, the 
argument in favor of enforcement becomes more persuasive in theory (but less so in 
practice), while the argument in favor of minimal regulation becomes bound up with 
questions of value. It thus appears that we face something of a choice going forward: 
either we continue to claim that autonomy is “the highest priority in the pantheon of 
arbitration values”263 but recognize that autonomy cannot fully explain the law’s 
rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements, or we insist that arbitration 
agreements must be rigorously enforced but begin considering what alternative 
values or policy rationales can be mustered in support of it.  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
so would create inefficiencies in the form of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or 
fact); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (enforcing 
arbitration clause despite plaintiff’s argument that compelling arbitration was inefficient 
because it would require related disputes to be resolved in separate arbitral and judicial forums 
rather than being consolidated before a court of law). 
 261. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985) (enforcing an 
arbitration agreement regardless of whether doing so would be “possibly inefficient”). 
 262. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. Jules Coleman has made a similar 
point in a different context. Cf. COLEMAN, supra note 255, at 138–39 (criticizing 
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 263. Brunet, supra note 16, at 5. 
